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Phillip Grayson, Editor

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Front Cover: From Chinese public health poster, US National Library of Medicine
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“We are in search of the force that is direct pure sober UNIQUE we are in search of NOTHING we affirm the VITALITY of every INSTANT”

Tristan Tzara
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Maryam Moosavi
O ur epigraph for this issue comes from the great Roman-
nian poet Tristan Tzara, in his poem “Proclamatin without
Pretense”. It contains the line: “We are in search of NOTH-ING”,
and this polyvalent sentiment has been a guiding concept
for the issue. To be in search of nothing could mean to be
in search of nothingness, a pursuit of oblivion that has its
romantic shadings, but which, ultimately, is not particularly
productive. To be in search of nothing could also mean to not
be in search at all. It is Tzara’s next line that twists the meaning
to the one we’ve chosen to work with: “we affirm the VITALITY
of every IN-STANT.” The intensity of the search is not dimin-
ished, but its objective is. There is enough vitality in every
instant to sustain a search that holds out no ultimate goal.
That is our goal in this issue.

The operating idea for this issue of Humanities
Review is flux. We have sought out works that engage with
a world that resists, at all costs, stasis, and that avoid within
themselves the alluring idea of settling easily into certainty.
Too often the work of criticism and analysis is a taming of
the works and ideas under scrutiny, a satisfying sense that
the unwieldiness of art or reality has been mastered and can
now be safely ignored. We sincerely hope that this issue will
provide little in the way of this type of satisfaction.

To this end, we have compiled a series of works that
refuse the settled ease of certainty.
To this end, we have compiled a series of works that refuse the settled ease of certainty.

“Of Scholarly Writing and Creative Writing (An Avant-Garde Approach)”, by Dibakar Pal opens the issue with a short piece on the distinction between artistry and scholarship, written almost aphoristically, in a style that recalls the meditations Renaissance thinkers like Montaigne run through the filter of twentieth century avant-gardes.

Following Pal’s piece, we have “Heidegger on Destruction”, in which Chin-Yi Chung details the always interesting intersections between Heidegger and Derrida, two thinkers who could easily be credited with centering the importance of instability and uncertainty in modern thought.

Finally, Lauren VanderLind, in her essay “Moderating Identities of Excess”, explores Adversary culture and the impact it has had on notions of individualism and collectivity in the late twentieth/early twentyfirst century.

After these broader entries, we move into more specific instances of contradiction and mediation. Nagwar A Soliman examines the poetry of Naguib Mahfauz’s Cairo trilogy, approaching ideas of patriarchy and feminism in ways that deeply unsettle conventional thought on the issue.

Dean Kritikos looks at the New York City poetry scene of the late twentieth century and explores the role played by physical space in creating and modifying the work done there.

Our final piece is Maryam Moosavi’s “The Unconscious Desire” which places the work of Sephiri and Dickinson in tension, drawing insights about each from the juxtaposition of two seemingly very different writers.

You may notice that there’s a distinct international flavor to this spring’s issue, with authors from around the world exploring works that are themselves spread far and wide, both spatially and chronologically. The contradicting realities of increasingly ill-defined and increasingly prominent national borders is certainly one of the tangled conceptual pairs we’ve tried to explore in this issue.

And so without further ado...

Phillip Grayson
New York, 2014
Of Scholarly Writing and Creative Writing (An Avant-Garde Approach)

Dibakar Pal, University of Calcutta

Who is a scholar? A widely read person is a scholar. But a creative writer (creator hereinafter) may not have such extensive study. Even without a so-called formal education, an individual may be a creator. A scholar gets brilliant results on examinations. In other words, the score is the yardstick of a scholar. The better the marks, the more scholarily an individual is. On the other hand, a creator, generally, cannot get good results and even sometimes fails to qualify in examinations. He becomes a drop out. His successful failure paves the way to being a creator. He prefers the life of a vagabond. Perhaps, failure renders an individual a creative writer. Thus, disqualification is his qualification.

A scholar has a thirst for knowledge. But a creator feels a need to create something new. Both of them try to increase knowledge. A scholar continues his study to widen the horizon and spectrum of his knowledge. He can do anything to acquire knowledge. For that reason he undertakes painstaking endeavors to realize his ambition. A creator also starts his study like a scholar. But on the way, creativity disturbs his attention towards studies and leads him to do something new, thus rendering him a diverted genius. And finally a creator fails in exams due to a lack of preparation. Thus a creator ultimately becomes a misguided missile. He lacks in hard reality. He has no foresight. He wastes valuable time in childhood.
compensated for in the future. Such callousness offers him lifelong pain till he breathes his last. Misfortune dogs him wherever he goes. As such, an unguarded childhood is a curse. A creator is such a curse's victim. No one laughs for him; everybody laughs at him. Thus he dies unpaid. Thus he dies unfed. Thus he dies unmourned. Thus he dies unsung. And he thus dies unknown, like other nameless thousands in the world. A scholar makes brilliant results and paves his way towards temporal gain. Both the scholar and the creator start with studies, but the former finishes them while the latter leaves. After the successful completion of studies, a scholar is awarded certificate from an educational institution but the creator is not since he does not complete the course. He left the institution to become free from the burden of 'so-called formal education,' instead. This certificate is the password for all future happiness. It is the gate pass to dreamland. Everybody knows it except the creator. Here lies the tragedy of a creator. This is the irony of his Fate. They say a scholar works hard, but a creator hardly works hard. This assumption is not correct always. A creator also toils much, maybe, for classical return.

Everybody cares for and respects a scholar. But a creator is ignored. He has innovative power. Imaginative faculty of mind agitates him much. So he is compelled to forget his mundane existence. Wild flights of fancy chase him from one galaxy to another. As a result, a creator fails everywhere in this world and becomes a laughingstock. His business is having no return at all. This is the sad story of a backward society. In an enlightened society creators are valued, history is full of successful and respected creative writers.

Scholarly writing is pregnant with facts. Creative writing is enriched with flair. As such, the writing of a scholar lacks imagination but is full of information. A scholar, in fact, is always guided by reference. But no reference is the preference of a creator since his writings are based mostly on hearsay. Thus creative writing is akin to and an alias of hearsay writing. A scholar always pays attention to chronological and systematic representation in her writings. But the talent of a creator is scattered.

In every sphere of life we expect consistency. We hate inconsistency since it has no exchange value. But consistency is the manifestation of artificiality already in man. On the other hand, inconsistency is the outcome of natural trait of an individual. Nature itself is inconsistent in its nature and behavior. For example, the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. But both sunrise and sunset do not happen at the same time. A man who, everyday, comes in time has to face a lot of trouble. Every morning does not dawn on him the same.

Inconsistency faces no such troubles. Spontaneity is the alias of inconsistency. Inconsistency needs no practice. It is quite natural like a spring of the mountain. But one has to practice much to be a consistent artist, i.e., an artificial individual.

A scholar, basically, is a consistent person. His consistency may not show
equality always. In the worst case, he may be inconsistently consistent. Thus whatever the case may be in the activity of a scholar, there must be an essence of consistency at least.

But a creator is very whimsical. He is a vagabond. In fact a creator is an inconsistent individual by birth. He will either be consistently inconsistent or, in most of the cases, inconsistently inconsistent. In real life, consistency has immense value. There is no substitute for consistency. In fact consistency itself is its own substitute.

A scholar is a biased person. He, generally, is influenced by knowledge, i.e., other men’s thoughts. Thus acquired knowledge kills his clarity of thought and thereby his originality.

As such his innovative power is defeated by the giant: Knowledge. A scholar beats everybody’s drum except his own. But a creator is undaunted and a confident person.

This world is for scholars, of scholars, by scholars. So everywhere we see the infrastructure of manufacturing scholars. Creators are unwanted in a society that lacks in aesthetic essence. That’s why only a scholar gets scholarships. The scholars build the nation. If it is so, creators are the ornament of a nation. Thus scholars are the builders of a building and creators are its decorators. A scholar is a civil engineer, a creator is an architect. Thus scholars are must for the nation, but creators are optional. Without architectural or aesthetic beauties a building can stand erect, so scholars are rewarded and creators die unfed. Thus to give a scholarship to a creator is nothing but wastage of money. A scholar needs a dollar. Conversely, a dollar makes a scholar.

A creator always feels compelled to communicate what he feels. He expresses simply so that everybody can realize what he says. But a scholar is a man of complex mind. His allusions may not be easily understandable. He also has no commitment to actually communicate his lofty thoughts. So the contribution of a scholar is the so-called ‘large still books’ which remain unread.

In creative writing there must not be any influence of other schools of thoughts. But scholarly writing is fully pregnant with the different thoughts of its predecessors. A pure creator is seldom born, but pure scholars are abundant in the world. There must be a shadow of external influence that devours, like an eclipse, the spontaneity of a scholar.

Reading means to increase knowledge as well as to welcome an invasion of other thoughts. A scholar considers the voice of a book final. But a creator values his own choice. So he declines to admit the sayings of a book, preferring to preach his own views without being influenced by the news of a book. As such, a creator reads very cautiously lest he be influenced by other schools of thought. Now he who wants to be a scholar should be absorbed in studies freely without any tension but with great attention.
A scholar compiles a dictionary. He explains the meaning of the words which are chronologically arranged in a definite manner. But a creator interprets the meaning of any word from a different point of view. His way of representation has a rare individual style. This different point of view and new light illuminate the dark avenue to reach an un-trodden destination. Thus this endeavor kindles the imagination of an inquisitive heart.

Degree of reference, in scholarly writing, is the yardstick of a scholar. The more references the more scholarly, the less references the less scholarly. Similarly, no references means no scholar. In fact, a scholar lives and dies with references. He cannot think without references. To her, no reference is also a reference, like no politics is also a politics or no style is also a style or no statistics is also statistics. Nothingness implies everything, no existence means staying elsewhere beyond our knowledge as well. Many would disagree with this high opinion.

On the other hand, recourse to reference is considered the demerit of a creator. There should be room for diversity in scholarly writing as well. All scholars, generally, use the same point of reference. As such, scholarly writings may have similarities with each other. This is due to the so-called fact that great men think alike. In other words all roads lead to Rome. But creative writings differ with each other. They differ even on any definite topic. They think not alike. They follow no rule at all, rather break the rules.

A creator goes ahead with a hypothesis. He tries to establish it. If he fails, he modifies it and ultimately finds the truth i.e., the theory. So, he uses no reference at all. But his works are used as reference by the scholars to get PhDs. References are a must to prepare a doctoral thesis. If any scholar does not give references then the reviewers will reject the thesis forthwith without examination in spite of any sufficient merit. The creator does not use reference and remains unrewarded. But giving of references is nothing but simply mentioning the name of the books or journals. It adds no contribution at all in the whole thesis.

The creator respects the reviewers as learned. To him reviewers are always versatile geniuses with infinite wisdom. He thinks that the reviewers are always busy to update themselves with the latest knowledge. So he finds no justification to mention the reference i.e., the source of knowledge to the highly knowledgeable critic-cum-reviewers.

Mathematicians are the most creative people ever. However, to prove their theorems and formulae they have to stick to a rigid form of writing. Still, that enables them to communicate to a fellow mathematician in a language they understand. Sticking to rigid methods of presentation of information and loss of creativity are not synonymous.

A scholar copies and gives reference. When number of reference is less it is called ‘plagiarism’. Unfortunately, a novice scholar is called a ‘plagiarist’. But a huge number of references crown such a ‘plagiarist’ a researcher. So a little steal-
ing is theft but a lot of stealing is research. Through stealing, a researcher becomes an expert.

Now the question arises – who is an expert? They say an expert is one who complicates simple things. An expert, to prove his expertise, can convert the complex into simplicity and the simple into complexity with ease. The expert laughs at an innocent heart for its foolishness and helplessness and thereby enjoys sadistic pleasure through his complications. A creator is free from all such allegations of plagiarism or expertise.

There are two types of people. One knows something of everything and the other knows everything of something. The former is an amateur. He is merely a novice having superficial knowledge on any topic between heaven and earth. The other one is a specialist and a professional one. He can talk on the concerned specific field hour on hour. To show his expertise, he can write on statistics without any statistics. Reference is a hurdle. An author can describe anything with suitable example without mentioning a reference. This helps a lay reader and even a scholar grasp any matter easily. This method paves the way to the pleasure of reading and thereby offers relaxation at leisure moments.

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There are two types of writers. One finds pleasure when the reader understands his writing. The other class likes to remain obscure. It is a fact that he who realizes any matter clearly can explain it lucidly. A scholar enjoys it when his writings remain incomprehensible to others. It may be a merit for a scholar but it is the misfortune of a reader. A creator enjoys immense and intense heavenly delight when the reader catches his drift. He feels attuned to the readers. Thus a creator wants to share his ideas and thoughts. But a scholar keeps safe distance, lest he should come close.

There are two types of writing, namely writing before reading and writing after reading. A scholar first reads then writes. But a creator writes without reading. He reads if he likes. He reads not if he likes not. Thus to him reading is quite optional. As a result the creation of a creator has three outcomes. In the first outcome he contributes nothing but wins the crown of a great man. For, great men think alike. So, without reading or knowing anything, a man becomes
great through ignorance. Ignorance is a blessing. A creator or a novice writer is thus divinely blessed. This is quite a noble and warm feeling. In the second case the writing is dissimilar to others. Then it is called creation. In the third case the writing signifies nothing or quite rubbish. As such it is thrown into the dustbin. But the creator argues that the present scholars can't realize the inner meaning of his so called obscure matter. The scholars of the future must illuminate this dark assertion.

In English grammar there are two types of articles, the definite and indefinite. The truth is always one. But lies are many. A teacher advises, speak the truth and never tell a lie. Thus the definite article, ‘the’ is used before the truth, but the indefinite article, ‘a’ is used before a lie. The proverb goes: “Many men, many minds.” Different critics explain a single matter differently and independently. Great men think alike. But more than one meaning is found in the market on a single issue. Thus so many scholars deal with so many lies.

Wisdom is the glamour of a learned scholar. Through serious study, constant meditation and continuous experience he becomes wise. A creator becomes a scholar when he uses reference. Similarly, a scholar becomes a creator without using any reference. Perhaps both of them dwell at the threshold of creativity and scholarship.
In this paper I will examine Heidegger’s move to set out the task of philosophy as the destruction of metaphysics to move into the realm of ontology, or an inquiry into the being of Being. I will read destruction in various Heidegger texts and point out its problematic as suggested by Derrida, that every instance of the destruction of metaphysics is in fact a repetition of it as it borrows entirely from the structure of metaphysics it sets out to destroy. The impossibility of the distinction between the transcendental and empirical is its own possibility as difference between the transcendental and empirical distinguishes and separates nothing, hence Heidegger’s anti-metaphysics and post-representation is no different from the transcendental idealism he destroys. Derrida thus rescues the phenomenological project by discovering the quasi-transcendental, that which is neither transcendental nor empirical, as the condition that allows the thinking of both through iterability and difference.

Heidegger writes that the task of philosophy is the destruction of the history of ontology:

We understand this task as one in which by taking the question of Being as our clue, we are to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being— the ways which have guided us ever since.
Written in 1927 in Being and Time, this notion of destruction of ancient ontology may be illuminated further what Heidegger writes of the end of philosophy in his 1964 essay “The End of Philosophy and the task of thinking.” Originally presented at a conference in France in 1964, this essay was subsequently published in French in 1966 in a collection entitled Kierkegaard Vivant (Paris: Gallimard 1966) and translated into English in 1969. Heidegger’s project in these texts is to rethink philosophy by pronouncing an end or destruction of traditional metaphysics and rethink the task of thinking that takes the form of aletheia, or unconcealing of truth. The question we will first concern ourselves with is this destruction of ancient ontology. What does the destruction of the tradition entail and what are its implications?

Firstly to analyze the paragraph, task refers to the task of destruction which means putting aside or dismantling merely historical assertions of the history of philosophy and metaphysics. To destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology means to overcome metaphysics by moving beyond philosophy as realism and idealism, which are primarily epistemological, into philosophy as ontology, which involves a primordial grasp of philosophy as the disclosure or unconcealing of Being. As Heidegger has argued, destruction is not liquidating but putting aside and dismantling assertions about philosophy which are merely historical. The task of philosophy is now to overcome metaphysics, taking the question of Being as our clue, for Heidegger’s interest is moving beyond the mere metaphysical assertions about philosophy to move into ontology- which is a more primordial grasp of Being and the essence of Dasein as temporality and being-towards-death as well as the hermeneutics of facticity and an awareness of Dasein’s comportment to the world as worldhood, which relates Dasein to objects as equipment and ready-to-hand rather than present-at-hand. The primordial experiences which have determined the ways of Being are the experiences of worldhood as care and anxiety, and boredom. Dasein experiences being-in-the-world and thrown-ness with the disclosure of this state through moods such as angst and boredom, in which Dasein experiences a sense of alienation and inauthenticity or discomfort with Dasein’s thrown-ness in the world, or being-in-the-world.

Primordial Experiences which determine the Nature of Being

Heidegger argues that in spite of all our interest in metaphysics, the question of the meaning of Being, or “the nature of Being”, has been overlooked and neglected. The “primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being- the ways which have guided us ever since” refers to the discoursse of Dasein’s thrown-ness or being-in-the-world through moods such as angst and boredom. In anxiety or angst for instance, Dasein experiences a sense
of alienation, or “not being at home” in the world, angst is directed towards nothing specific but is encountered as a general sense of dread directed towards “nothing” but “being-in-the-world”. In angst, Dasein experiences anxiety about Dasein’s state of thrown-ness and experiences a sense of inauthenticity in one’s involvement in the world. Dasein normally overcomes this by “fleeing” towards further immersion in the world or becoming one with the “they” in order to overcome one’s sense of alienation. Angst or anxiety is thus a state of disclosure of one’s thrown-ness or being-in-the-world through an experience of inauthenticity and alienation from Dasein’s involvement with the world, or the ‘they’. The other mood that Dasein experiences is boredom, which is elaborated in the next section.

Phenomenology of Boredom

In Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger posits the fundamental attitude and comportment of Dasein as boredom. In his exposition of this fundamental mood of Dasein, Heidegger posits that boredom is a characteristic of the object while dependent on the subject for attribution, thus conflating subject and object in the act of perception. Heidegger also radicalizes Husserl’s notion of intentionality in suggesting perception is an affect, and effect of, thing perceived. It is mutually implicated in the object, and the object infects the subject with the perception of boredom in other words. This phenomenology of boredom thus immerses Dasein in the world by infecting, and being infected by, the fundamental mood of boredom. Heidegger’s phenomenological method of conflating subject and object, perception and thing perceived, comes close to Derrida’s contamination of the transcendental and empirical. However while Heidegger seems to unite transcendental and empirical, or collapse transcendental-empirical difference, Derrida posits the relation between the two as one of difference with repetition, or differance. Derrida’s move differs from Heidegger’s thus in not being an empirical psychology but a metaphysics which is extended to include absence and differance. Rather than privileging the empirical over the transcendental, Derrida posits the quasi-transcendental as the spacing, trace and limit which enables the thinking of both transcendental and empirical and hence performs a meta-phenomenology rather than a reversed phenomenology like Heidegger.

Destroying Ancient Ontology and the task of philosophy

Heidegger writes in What is Philosophy that destruction does not mean destroying but dismantling, liquidating, putting to one side the merely historical assertions about the history of philosophy. The task of philosophy is now
designated by Heidegger to overcome the history of metaphysics, which has trapped philosophy in representational thinking and Platonism. In place of metaphysics as representation or logos, Heidegger writes that philosophy should be an inquiry of the being of Being, thus moving philosophy beyond metaphysics into the realm of ontology. The history of metaphysics, or ancient ontology, has to be overcome as it inaccurately creates a division between ideal and real, subject and object. Heidegger argues that these are conflated in Being. Being is the founding condition of possibility and ontological ground for both. The end of philosophy signals the end of metaphysics as ancient ontology, or representational thought which presents a perfect correlation between essence and existence, concept and reality, because these are conflated in Being. Being is the ground of possibility for thinking both. Essence and existence are united in Being. As Heidegger argues in The End of Philosophy:

If the questions raised are thought through even thoroughly, the illusion of being as a matter of course, in which the distinction of essentia and existentia stands for all metaphysics, disappears. This distinction is groundless if metaphysics simply tries again and again to define the limits of what is divided, and comes up with numbering the manners of possibility and the kinds of actuality which float into vagueness, together with the difference in which they are already placed.

Heidegger argues that the distinction between essentia and existentia that has held throughout the history of metaphysics presents an illusion and becomes groundless as both are united in Being. Being is the ontological ground of both and thus precedes both.

Heidegger argues that metaphysics has sustained itself through an illusory distinction between whatness and thatness, or ideal and real. Heidegger argues that Being, or thatness, makes possible the essence of Being, or whatness, hence metaphysics has proceeded along failed presuppositions. In Being, whatness and thatness are united, Being translates as the ontological pre-condition that determines both. Truth as metaphysics, which has sustained itself through the illusory distinction between whatness and thatness, has thus approached its end. Heidegger argues that the task of thinking becomes to rethink truth as aletheia, or the disclosure of Being as truth. Truth has to be rethought as the un concealing of Being as aletheia, rather than as a concealment as the Greeks such as Plato and Aristotle have interpreted it. Heidegger’s conflation of essence and existence in Being does nothing to alter the fundamental structure of metaphysics which he borrows from and thus affirms. Rather, Derrida’s notion of iterability, traces the condition of possibility for the production of both through the distinguishing trace of difference. This goes beyond Heidegger’s collapsing of this distinction into the
singular Being in examining the meta-conditions in which essence and existence are produced. An inversion or negation of metaphysics repeats it by borrowing its ontological structure and vocabulary, according to Derrida. Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics is thus a repetition of metaphysics in every sense of the word as a negative metaphysics remains a form of metaphysics, repeating its structure and vocabulary. In showing that metaphysics and post-metaphysics share the same ontological vocabulary, Derrida demonstrates that there is no difference between metaphysics and Heidegger’s post-metaphysics. Heidegger names the essence of Being as existence, but this is merely a reversed metaphysics which repeats the ontological structure of metaphysics, just as conflating existence and essence in Being borrows from the ontological structure of metaphysics and thus remains metaphysics. Heidegger requires the transcendental to be excluded and accounted for on empirical grounds in order to maintain his situated realm of Being. Heidegger thus excludes the quasi-transcendental, or transcendental-empirical difference, which is precisely what he needs to maintain his philosophy. Were there no quasi-transcendental or written mark, it would be impossible to designate as Heidegger does, a pure realm of empirical signs. Heidegger thus needs to acknowledge this quasi-transcendental that he needs in order for his empiricism to function and thus inscribe his phenomenology in a more powerful way as Derrida would suggest.

Overcoming metaphysics and the End of philosophy

Still on the “destruction of ancient ontology”, Heidegger writes in The End of Philosophy that metaphysics is something to be overcome. Heidegger argues that metaphysics has been the ground of misunderstanding by preventing access in experience to the essence of Being. This essence of Being is something that itself allows the overcoming of Being, it is an acknowledgement of the temporality, facticity, and thrown-ness of Being. While metaphysics has been thought to be the truth of being, it translates as the oblivion of Being, namely, it destroys and prevents access to the disclosure of Being as aletheia, of Being as fundamentally situated and thrown in the world. The history of metaphysics becomes something to be overcome, as this past binds us to an erroneous conception of truth as an idea, or essence that is concealed. Heidegger argues that metaphysics has entered its end with the disclosure of Being, or aletheia, as truth in place of truth as metaphysics. In every instance of this description however, Heidegger repeats metaphysics by borrowing from its terms as something to be overcome, destroyed and denounced, and thus proceeds to re-inscribe it entirely within its language. Heidegger thus does not escape metaphysics but is doomed to repeat the metaphysics he sets out to destroy by repeating its entire structure and ontological terminology.
Heidegger writes that metaphysics is in decline and is approaching its end, as the earth informed by metaphysics has become desolate. This is evident from the events of the last century. This decline marks the oblivion of Being as metaphysics, as the truth of metaphysics has met its desolation. Heidegger argues that metaphysics has been an illusion that sustained reality and is now approaching its end, in place, truth needs to be rethought as the unconcealment of Being as aletheia. In this disclosure of Being, the essence of Being in is factity, thrown-ness, temporality is revealed and the metephyysical past of Being meets its oblivion.

As previously stated however, this so called overcoming of metaphysics becomes repetition of metaphysics in every sense as it designates metaphysics as something to be overcome and destroyed. It thus proceeds entirely within its terms rather than proceeding to new territory. While emphasizing in place facticity, thrown-ness and temporality as the essence of Being this radicalization of intentionality merely subverts or reverses the existing metaphysical structure and thus repeats it as an empirical rather than transcendental idealism. Far from escaping metaphysics, Heidegger thus repeats it in every sense by being bound to the language of metaphysics in designating it as something to be overcome and destroyed. As Derrida argues, a negative metaphysics remains a form of metaphysics and is no different from metaphysics because it borrows entirely from its vocabulary and ontological structure. Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics is hence, a repetition of it rather than any true departure or overcoming of metaphysics. In showing post-metaphysics repeats the ontological vocabulary of metaphysics, Derrida demonstrates that Heidegger’s inversion of metaphysics is repetition, and hence, paradoxically, affirmation. It is the quasi-transcendental or the written mark, functioning as if it was transcendental, which enables metaphysics as it is the conditionality of transcendental-empirical differentiation as well as the condition of impossibility for designating an exclusive sphere of empirical signs. The quasi-transcendental relates the transcendental and empirical in simultaneous identity and difference, identity and non-identity. Hence Heidegger’s exclusion of idealism depends on the possibility of distinguishing the transcendental and empirical through the quasi-transcendental. Were there no written mark or quasi-transcendental, Heidegger would not be able to distinguish the transcendental and empirical and reduce metaphysics to anthropological empiricism. Heidegger hence suppresses differance and the quasi-transcendental as the true conditionality of metaphysics. Heidegger requires the exclusion of the transcendental to maintain his anthropological and empirical realm of Being. Empirical thus only exists in relation to the transcendental through iterability and differance.

The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking
In the “End of Philosophy and the task of thinking”, Heidegger writes that philosophy as metaphysics has reached its end. This refers to metaphysics that thinks beings as being in the manner of representational thinking, which presents the ground of being as an absolute presence, as the transcendental making possible as the ontic causation of the real, as the transcendental making possible of the objectivity of objects. This ground of being as presence has reached its completion and perfection as metaphysics has fulfilled itself as a form of Platonism and all its subsequent reversals of it in Nietzsche and Marx’s thought have signalled that metaphysics has entered its final stage. Heidegger thus thinks of the end of philosophy as the completion and fulfillment of metaphysics, which has simultaneously exhausted itself in its fulfillment and is thus undergoing reversal and destruction in its final stages in the thought of Nietzsche and Marx. What Heidegger fails to note however that is that the destruction of metaphysics borrows entirely from its terms. A reversed Platonism is still a Platonism, just as a destruction of metaphysics remains metaphysics even if only in a negative sense. Heidegger, in his task of destruction, thus repeats metaphysics entirely by proceeding from within the bounds of its language, terminology and ontological structure which he merely negates and thus paradoxically affirms.

The Shift from Metaphysics to Ontology

In Towards the Definition of Philosophy, Heidegger contests the philosophical enframing of world-view strictly in terms of science. This is part of Heidegger’s move away from ancient ontology which philosophy must destroy to arrive at the primordial experiences which determine the nature of Being. The problem with such a philosophical enframing according to Heidegger is its circularity in trying to justify ontology with theory- in other words, metaphysical axioms are being used to justify themselves in a circle, the problem that this gives rise to is ontological difference, or the institution of a gulf between the transcendental and empirical. Heidegger questions the separation of existence and essence, arguing that the problem with philosophy that is strictly critical idealism or critical realism is its one-sided world view, in other words, both idealism and realism are circular and one-sided in failing to grasp the fundamental ontological difference between the transcendental and empirical. In Being and Time Heidegger argues that both realism and idealism fall short of truth, which rather than being located in either realism or idealism, is defined as aletheia, or the unveiling of truth through the disclosure of being. For Heidegger being-in-the-world or ontology precedes essence, thus critical idealism and the phenomenological reduction fails to grasp being- the essential whatness and existence of a thing. Heidegger seeks to free
Heidegger's phenomenology, in place of intuition, privileges corporeality, embodiment or being-in-the-world. Heidegger criticizes Husserl for his Cartesianism, emphasizing the situated-ness or thrown-ness of being. This radicalizes Husserl's theory of intentionality in returning to the things themselves and performing a reverse bracketing of intuition in its place. We will see with Derrida a middle ground, as he posits the quasi-transcendental, which is neither transcendental nor empirical but the economy of both the transcendental and empirical and the difference between them. Heidegger collapses the transcendental-empirical difference by suggesting that being precedes both essence and existence, in them the two meet and are conflated. Being is the ground of both the transcendental and empirical. Heidegger collapses subject-object difference by suggesting that consciousness essentially belongs to being-in-the-world or concrete existence. This of course, will be eventually critiqued by Derrida as the privileging of transcendental subjectivity and presence.

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For Heidegger being-in-the-world is disclosed or unveiled through the equipmental nature of perception, or the experience of objects as ready-to-hand rather than present-at-hand. The Senegal African for instance fails to recognize the lectern for what it is because it is alien to him in its equipmental nature. This demonstrates that the world is disclosed through its instrumentality to human beings. Phenomenology must thus recognize this fundamental thrown-ness, or being-in-the-world, and read objects as a disclosure of being-in-the-world rather than merely present-at-hand, because this is how we fundamentally experience objects, not as phenomenology from the logical prejudice of theory in radicalizing phenomenology by returning to concrete existence.
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This of course, is at direct odds with Husserl’s separation of immanent and transcendent perception. Heidegger collapses subject-object difference in positing the two not as separate substances, but rather that they belong to being and perception as the disclosure or unveiling of being. Being thus unites transcendental and empirical or collapses transcendental-empirical difference in Heidegger’s emphasis on ontology over metaphysics. Rather than separate consciousness from the world as Husserl did, Heidegger posits both as co-existent in the concrete existence of Dasein.

Derrida will not collapse subject-object difference to conflate them into Being. Rather Derrida posits the relation between ideal and real as difference, a difference that distinguishes nothing, and separates nothing, as the transcendental is nothing outside the empirical. Derrida thus builds on Heidegger’s collapsing of the distinction to posit the difference as a paradoxical difference which is not a difference, but a sameness. Derrida thus builds on Heidegger’s destruction or collapsing of subject-object difference to develop his deconstruction, which affirms the paradoxical nature, and aporia, of the relationship between the transcendental and empirical.

In History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger’s examination of intentionality and categorical intuition posits that perception is not separate from thing perceived, but that the two are fundamentally related in the act of perceiving, the intending of an object is thus a disclosure of its being or existence. Heidegger thus conflates transcendental and empirical in his definition of perception as the disclosure or unveiling of being. Derrida will extend Heidegger’s observations, not by conflating perception with thing perceived, but by highlighting the relationship of repetition. Perception is the iterated of thing perceived. The difference between transcendental and empirical, is the condition of possibility of perception. Rather than conflate the transcendental and the empirical into the singular entity of being thus, Derrida stresses the fundamental relationship of repetition with a difference or iterability. Heidegger suggests that perception is a disclosure of the extant nature of being, and thus conflates perception and thing in his notion of being and its unveiling or disclosure. He thus collapses the transcendental-empirical distinction by framing it in different terms- being, which is transcendental, is disclosed through the empirical in the form of perception, and Heidegger does not posit the two as separate substances like Husserl.
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The distinction between "Ready-to-hand" and "Present-at-hand"

Heidegger defines the "present-at-hand" as something alien to Dasein's character and Dasein's sense of utility. As Heidegger puts it: "Ontologically existential is tantamount to being-present-at-hand, a kind of Being which is essentially inappropriate to Dasein's character." The present at hand is thus alien to Dasein's notion of his Being and existence, which conceives of things in relation to himself as ready to hand.

As Heidegger states: "The essence of Dasein lies in its existence. Accordingly those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity are not "properties" present-at-hand of some entity which "looks" so and so and is itself present-at-hand; they are in each case possible ways for it to be, and no more than that. All the Being-as-it-is which this entity possesses is primarily Being. So when we designate this entity with the term 'Dasein' we are expressing not its "what" but its Being.

Dasein thus appropriates objects not in terms of its "whatness" or "presence-at-hand" but in terms of its being, which is related in terms of its equipmentality, or 'readiness-to-hand'.

Heidegger further writes that "All entities whose being "in" one another can thus be described have the same kind of Being – that of Being-present-at-hand- as Things occurring within the world. Being-present-at-hand "in" something which is likewise present-at-hand. And being-present-at-hand-along-with (Mitvohardensein) is the sense of a definite location-relationship with something else which has the same kind of Being, are ontological characteristics which we call "categorical" they are of such a sort as to belong to entities whose kind of Being is not of the character of Dasein."

Being present-at-hand is thus a thing which Dasein does not conceive a relationship to in terms of his Being, and existence, we can take certain objects, for instance, an inanimate stone, rock or starfish, which we do not conceive a relation to in terms of function and utility, and thus these objects become merely present-at-hand. Being ready-to-hand, on the other hand, is defined thus: "The kind of Being which equipment possesses- in which it manifests itself in its own right- we call "readiness-to-hand" (Zuhandenhheit). Only because equipment has this "Being-in-itself" and does not merely occur, is it manipulable in the broadest sense, and at our disposal."

Readiness-to-hand is thus how Dasein relates to the Being that surrounds himself,
including Nature, it is how Dasein conceives its own worldhood by relating to the objects that surround himself, in terms of its equipmentmentality, function and utility.

Heidegger further discusses the distinction: "Similarly, when something ready-to-hand is found missing, though its every presence (Zugegensein) has been so obvious that we have never taken notice of it, this makes a break in those referential contexts which circumspection discovers. Our circumspection comes up against emptiness, and now sees for the first time what the missing article was ready-to-hand with, and what it was ready-to-hand for. The environment announces itself afresh. What is thus lit up is to not itself just one thing ready-to-hand among others, still less is it something present-at-hand upon which equipment ready-to-hand is somehow founded, it is in the 'there' before anyone has observed or ascertained it. It is itself inaccessible to circumspection, but in each case it has already been disclosed for circumspection."

The ready-to-hand is thus what the environment discloses itself to Dasein as being and equipment, it is separate from the present-at-hand which is not merely a concealed ready-to-hand but something which is alien to the worldhood of Dasein and his Being. The present-at-hand is what is not appropriated by Dasein to his sense of worldhood, it is alien to Dasein in terms of equipmentality. Further, "But if the world can, in a way, be lit up, it must assuredly be disclosed. And it has already been disclosed beforehand whenever what is ready-to-hand within-the-world is accessible for circumspective concern. The world is therefore something wherein Dasein as an entity already was, and if in any matter it explicitly comes away from anything, it can never do more than come back to the world. Being-in-the-world, according to our Interpretation hitherto, amounts to a non-thematic circumspective absorption in references or arguments constitutive for the readiness-to-hand of a totality of equipment."

Dasein's fundamental comportment to the world is thus this disclosedness or unconcealing of objects as ready-to-hand and as equipment, rather than present-at-hand which describes objects that are alien to Dasein's being or character. These present-at-hand objects describe mere things which are beyond the everyday uses of Dasein and are not appropriated by Dasein into his worldhood as equipment. Yet what is present-at-hand can become ready-to-hand if Dasein decides to appropriate it as such into his worldhood, the disclosure of ready-to-hand is essentially an act of interpretation in terms of equipmentality which changes according to the needs of Dasein. An inanimate stone thus, that might seem present-at-hand for a moment, will become ready-to-hand when Dasein wishes to use it, for example, to attack someone or as construction equipment.

Heidegger on phenomenology as destruction
Heidegger analyses the terms phenomenology to derive the terms ‘phenomenon’ and ‘logos’. For Heidegger, the phenomenon is what an appearance reveals or discloses itself to be, combined with logos, which means truth. The Greeks have misinterpreted truth as a form of covering up or concealing in terms of ideas which remain inaccessible. Heidegger argues that phenomenology is not a privileged access to ideas which have been concealed, but an interpretation of appearances, and a disclosure of being as alethia, truth discloses itself as being rather than as pure ideas as Husserl had argued. Dasein interprets appearances or phenomenon in terms of its equipmentality, as objects disclose themselves as ready-to-hand. Phenomenology is thus the hermeneutics and interpretive study of phenomena which disclose themselves as being present or being ready, Dasein appropriates objects and phenomena in terms of their relation to his worldhood.

Heidegger argues truth is not a concealing or a covering up, but an unconcealing, a disclosure of truth as alethia, and this truth that is disclosed is the truth of Being. Truth at most remains a non-perception but is never a concealing or covering up but always an unconcealing and a disclosure, or alethia.

Heidegger argues truth is disclosure or alethia rather than covering up, and further clarifies a misconception that a Greek conception of truth suffers from – it is only a ‘doctrine of ideas’ and a philosophical knowledge. It is not grounded in Being or facticity which is the authentic truth, Heidegger argues that truth is the disclosure of Being rather than a prism of ideas or pure knowledge which remains undisclosed or covered up.

Phenomenology is thus a hermeneutic, an interpretation of Dasein’s being, or an analytic of the existentiality of existence, it is thus an active interpretation of Being-in-the-world, thrown-ness and facticity rather than a knowledge of ideas which remain concealed. It is an interpretation of Dasein’s ontological historicity, and in every sense a hermeneutic which is not derived from the methodology of historiological sciences but an active interpretation of Being and existence.

The Nature of Being

Heidegger further argues that the fundamental nature of being, is temporality. Being is disclosed through its essential temporality and experience of care, or anxiety, for the future and being-towards-death. This sense of phenomenological disclosure through temporality is of course, a departure from Husserl who does not define the essence of being as time, but in terms of transcendental consciousness, and the purified transcendental ego which consciousness must be reduced to. Where Husserl and Heidegger converge, however, is their emphasis on the human subject and transcendental subjectivity. This is deemed by Derrida as an essential anthropocentrism and a privileging of being as presence.
To Husserl, this presence is intuition, given purely to itself, to Heidegger, this presence is the temporal notion of the present which is emphasized over the absences of past and the future which are actually the conditions of possibility for being. Heidegger's emphasis on the historicity of being further emphasizes its facticity, and situated-ness; being is grounded in the world by its past and defined by its present comportment towards the future in terms of choices- its facticity. This is essentially an empirical situatedness, which is of a radically different emphasis from Husserl's transcendental ego. Heidegger's emphasis on ontology and the return to the things themselves in emphasizing being-in-the-world is a radicalization of Husserl's notion of intentionality and an emphasis on empirical rather than transcendental constitution. As discussed above, Derrida's notion of difference mediates between the two by discovering the neither transcendental nor empirical quasi-transcendental which is the condition of possibility for thinking both. The meaning of Being is a hermeneutic, Dasein interprets the world around him in terms of its equipmentality or readiness to hand, phenomenology is thus an active interpretation and hermeneutics of Being rather than a static access to a prism of concealed ideas as metaphysics has had it. The destruction of the history of ontology is essentially bound up with the way that the question of Being is formulated, and it is possible only within such a formulation. In the framework of our treatise, which aims at working out that question in principle, we can carry out this destruction only with regard to stages of that history which are in principle decisive.

The destruction of the history of ontology is thus a shift beyond metaphysics that has historically determined philosophical thought to move into a thinking of something which is more primordial than metaphysics – which is the question of Being, which Heidegger will argue is the ground of metaphysics and what precedes it ontologically as its condition of possibility. Being becomes thus defined in terms of its potentiality for discourse, its possibilities in terms of choices in existence, defined in the present and the future. The "nature of Being" is defined in terms of its temporality. Being is conceived as a form of presence, it relates to past and future in terms of an absolute present which defines the past and future. Heidegger argues that ontology should move away from dialectic, which has become superfluous as in Being, subject and object are conflated, concept and exemplar are united. Being translates as the primordial structure of philosophy that precedes dialectic. Being appropriates possibilities in terms of making an object present to himself, this translates as the elevating of Being to presence which Derrida will eventually problematize as past and future are structurally necessary as absences or difference to the thinking of presence.
Aletheia

Moving on to Heidegger’s notion of truth as aletheia, reading from Heidegger:
What does the word about the untrembling heart of unconcealment mean? It means unconcealment itself in what is most its own, means the place of stillness which gathers in itself what grants unconcealment to begin with. That is the opening of what is open. We ask: openness for what? We have already reflected upon the fact that the path of thinking, speculative and intuitive, needs the traversable opening. But in that opening rests possible radiance, that is, the possible presencing of presence itself.

This unconcealment as a form of opening translates as the presencing of presence, a disclosure of presence, where it had previously remained hidden or concealed. Heidegger argues that this unconcealing is a radicalization of intentionality in returning to the things themselves.

Heidegger takes the call for a return “to the things themselves” as a call to move beyond metaphysics into ontology, to move beyond the thinking of idealism into the thinking of Being. Truth, which had been previously described as a form of concealment in Plato and Aristotle, becomes now reconfigured into aletheia, or unconcealing of Being, with Heidegger. Aletheia is not so much the disclosure of truth but what grants the very possibility of truth. The task of thinking becomes thus aletheia, to think that which grants the very possibility of truth as the unconcealing or disclosure of Being, an opening of presence to the outside rather than an imprisonment of it behind a veil of disclosure. The task of thinking as aletheia becomes thus a disclosure of Being, which opens presence to its outside, and thus to our ontological grasp of it. Being is thus disclosure rather than, as metaphysics has traditionally had it, a form of concealment and imprisonment in hidden ideal forms which remain inaccessible. This ontological grasp of Being as aletheia becomes thus the disclosure of truth, which renders accessible to us the primordial ways of Being mentioned at the beginning of this paper. Heidegger further discusses aletheia in “The Origin of the Work of Art”:
The artwork lets us know what the shoes are in truth. It would be the worst self-deception to think that our description, as a subjective action, had first depicted everything thus and then projected it into the painting. If anything is questionable here, it is rather that we experienced too little in the nearness of the work and that we expressed the experience too crudely and too literally. But above all, the work did not, as it might seem at first, serve merely for a better visualizing of what a piece of equipment is. Rather, the equipmentality of equipment first expressly comes to the fore through the work and only in the work.
Heidegger thus discusses aletheia as the disclosure of the truth of Being through art in terms of its equipmentality, or readiness-to-hand. Art discloses the truth of Being in its relation to Dasein in terms of its function as equipment for Dasein, indeed this is how Dasein fundamentally relates to the world, through the experience of things as either ready or present to hand. However, Heidegger’s notion of truth as aletheia, borrows its entire ontological framework of Being as presence from metaphysics. Heidegger describes this aletheia as an opening of presence to the outside the fundamental structure of presence as repetition, of essence and existence. Despite being conflated and unified in Heidegger’s work, aletheia borrows and proceeds entirely from the language of metaphysics and thus repeats the metaphysics he attempts to destroy. Heidegger’s unconcealing or aletheia does not alter the fundamental structures of metaphysics he sets out to destroy in the form of essence and existence which he conflates into Being but does not effect a change in the metaphysical or ontological structure by merely re-describing it as Being and its aletheia.

Heidegger radicalizes the notion of truth by describing it as unconcealing rather than concealing. In fact, what Heidegger is describing is the simple mediation of truth- truth can be reduced to its appearance rather than relegated to an external and concealed realm. Heidegger performs a reverse bracketing of truth by reducing phenomenology to appearance which conceals nothing and discloses truth, as he discusses in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. Phenomena reveals truth by disclosing its equipmental nature. Heidegger thus performs a negation of transcendent truth by reversing the nature of the phenomenon in describing it as not secondary and representative of the ideal but describes it as the fundamental principle of the ideal- phenomena discloses rather than conceals. There is no disjuncture or separation between signifier and signified, both are related in the principle of disclosure and revelation- the signifier is the signified, reality is ontological and a disclosure of equipmentality rather than a metaphysical reflection or representation of a transcendental signified. Truth is not representational. Rather, truth is disclosure of Being through the phenomenon. Truth is ontological rather than a metaphysical abstraction. Heidegger thus confluates signifier and signified in his conception of truth, but does nothing to alter the fundamental structure of metaphysics. Heidegger’s notion of disclosure rather than concealing still presents truth as a dual entity- consisting of the phenomenon and its presentation of truth as aletheia, or the unconcealing of Being. Positing that truth is something to be disclosed still separates truth ontologically into two realms, pre-disclosure and post-disclosure of the phenomenon as the revelation of Being. Heidegger thus repeats metaphysics although he reverses and negates it, as Derrida points out, a negative repetition of metaphysics proceeds entirely from its vocabulary and ontological structure. Heidegger’s radicalization of truth in describing it as unconcealing rather than concealing, is thus a negation
or reversal and thus a repetition of metaphysics rather than a destruction of it. Heidegger thus does not manage to escape metaphysics, as he sets out to do.

Derrida’s questioning of Heidegger

What Heidegger fails to note however with his destruction of metaphysics and his task to move beyond it is that in the process he repeats metaphysics and thus reinscribes it in his very task of destruction. There is no thought that escapes structure, whether it involves building a system around an arch or a system that decenters it. There is no language outside metaphysics and the structures that determine it. All languages and thought affirm the structurality of structure. As Derrida puts it: “This event I call a rupture, the disruption I alluded to at the beginning of this paper, presumably would have come about when the structurality of structure had begun to be thought, that is to say, repeated, and this is why I said this disruption was repetition in every sense of the word.” The rupture of metaphysics thus involved repetition and redoubling rather than being any simple decentering of metaphysics. Derrida argues that the event of a rupture that comes with the decentering of metaphysics involves a redoubling of metaphysics and an opening of metaphysics to think its Other. To quote Derrida, “What would this event be then? Its exterior form would be that of a rupture and a redoubling.” Structure is something that has either been affirmed or deviated from, all the time being re-inscribed in discourse. No discourse escapes structure and the metaphysical constraints it imposes in the form of the structurality of structure, whether the center is affirmed or negated. As Derrida argues: “There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language – no syntax or lexicon- which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest.” Derrida thus argues that we have no language which is not already informed by metaphysical presuppositions, hence all destructions of metaphysics that proceed from within the confines of language repeat the metaphysics they seek to destroy.

Conclusion

In this paper I have examined Heidegger’s move to set out the task of philosophy as the destruction of metaphysics to move into the realm of ontology, or an inquiry into the being of Being.
I have traced this movement of destruction in various Heidegger texts and pointed out its problematic as suggested by Derrida, that every instance of the destruction of metaphysics is in fact a repetition of it as it borrows entirely from the structure of metaphysics it sets out to destroy. Derrida critiques Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics in suggesting a non-metaphysics or destroyed metaphysics remains a metaphysics, and thus ultimately a destruction of metaphysics is simply a repetition or reproduction of it and hence, the same as metaphysics. Derrida thus discovers that metaphysics is repeated even in its destruction and thus is no different or the same as non-metaphysics or destroyed metaphysics. The impossibility of the distinction between the transcendental and empirical is its own possibility as difference between the transcendental and empirical distinguishes and separates nothing, hence Heidegger’s anti-metaphysics and post-representation is no different from the transcendental idealism he destroys. In so doing Derrida democratizes phenomenology, by showing that a non-metaphysics or destroyed metaphysics is no different and not superior to metaphysics as Heidegger had envisioned. Where Heidegger had sought to show that metaphysics is a fallacy, Derrida demonstrates that Heidegger does not manage to escape metaphysics as he sets out to do and thus Heidegger’s non-metaphysics does not differ essentially from metaphysics. As such, truth is neither representational nor post-representational, it is not a matter of choosing between transcendental or empirical, but quasi-transcendental; as the quasi-transcendental functions as the limit and spacing that enables the thinking of both transcendental and empirical through the distinguishing movement of difference and the trace. As transcendental-empirical difference is an illusion, then Derrida democratizes phenomenology in showing that metaphysics and post-metaphysics are paradoxically similar in their difference, identical in their non-identity. This space of the quasi-transcendental relates the transcendental and empirical in a relation of sameness in difference, distinctions translate paradoxically into non-distinctions because the transcendental and empirical are distinguished by nothing. It is the aporia between the transcendental and empirical which enables the thinking of both as difference, the interval between transcendental and empirical translates as a non-difference or sameness. It is the quasi-transcendental or the written mark, functioning as if it was transcendental, which enables metaphysics as it is the conditionality of transcendental-empirical differentiation as well as the condition of impossibility for designating an exclusive sphere of idealism or expressive signs, or empirical signs in converse. The quasi-transcendental relates the transcendental and empirical in simultaneous identity and difference, identity and non-identity. The necessity for the quasi-transcendental to distinguish the transcendental and empirical makes it impossible to separate transcendental and empirical as each separation depends on the other term for the distinction to be upheld. If there were no transcendental, then it would be impossible to distin-
guish, as Heidegger does, a pure empirical situatedness and idealism from it. The transcendental thus inhabits the empirical even as it is separated from it through the written mark or quasi-transcendental. Heidegger thus requires the transcendental in order to exclude it from his radical empirical situatedness and Being. Empirical thus exists only in relation to the transcendental through iterability and difference. Heidegger thus needs to acknowledge the quasi-transcendental in order for his phenomenology to be inscribed more powerfully through acknowledging the conditions that make it possible.

Bibliography


Adversary culture has taught us to distrust, and it seems we’ve been taught to do so for no reason other than for the value that has come to be placed on distrusting in and of itself. Like adversary culture’s penchant to oppose for opposition’s sake, it is our generation’s fate to distrust without any prerequisite reasoning. This shouldn’t downplay the importance of questioning as a method of learning and improving, as distrust can play a crucial role in this way, but it nevertheless becomes a problem when distrusting is prescribed without any particular goal in mind.

Our interest in what Fredric Jameson calls “nostalgia film” seems to indicate a deep desire for the past, perhaps in that we are looking for the meanings that have been lost through our perceived distancing from master narratives. We have cut ourselves off from the meanings that governed everyday life in the past through our disdain for various aspects of it. To take a Freudian approach, it can be seen that our strong aversion to the idea of master narratives is perhaps truly a guise that allows us to pretend that we aren’t afraid that they have become lost, and that we have become lost along with them (Doty 108).

Adversary culture in the 1960s impacted society in ways that can still be felt today. Although the adversary culture of the sixties has morphed from resistance with an
end goal to mass-marketed rebellion for rebellion's sake, it has not lost its hold in postmodernity. The master narratives that used to bind us together culturally have begun to erode, leaving us ungrounded within a seemingly ever-widening global context. It may appear that all such narratives have long since disappeared, but we are in fact replacing them with the contradictory narratives driven by the radical individualism of capitations adversary culture and the conservative, collective “mandates” of our economic system.

With the rise of adversary culture in the 1960s came an increasing distrust of master narratives, the cultural mythologies that provide us with a sense of collective identity, telling us who we are, where we came from, what we should value, how we can differentiate ourselves from others, what role(s) we fill in the world, and even where we are headed. Not surprisingly, this distrust led to an overall discarding of master narratives, and some troubling consequences, as Jameson makes clear when he notes “the disappearance of a sense of history, the way in which our entire contemporary social system has little by little begun to lose its capacity to retain its own past, has begun to live in a perpetual present and in a perpetual change that obliterates traditions of the kind which all earlier social formations have had in one way or another to preserve” (143–4). This breakdown of collective life is perhaps best reflected in the growing emphasis placed on individuality and subjectivity, which has parallels in the art of the ’60s. Modern literature exhibited a distinct individualism, as fully unique writing styles became the trend; according to Jameson, “All of these styles, however different from each other, are comparable in this: each is quite unmistakable; once one is learned, it is not likely to be confused with something else” (130). This is a marked shift in art from the ancient sense of the artist as a conduit through which the muse spoke to the artist as a central feature of his or her art—the artist, in this sense, ceases to serve the collective and places increasing emphasis on his or her individuality.

The emphasis on the individual, whether in result of or simply mirrored by literature, spread to the point that personal uniqueness came to replace cultural solidarity. Concurrently, there came a conscious movement to merge art and the everyday—the sixties possessed “a mood which turned against art, and an effort by a cultural mass to adopt and act out the life-style which hitherto had been the property of a small and talented elite” (Bell 123). If this is the case, it is little wonder that the eventual fragmentation of identity expressed in literature came to be predominant in the lives of what Daniel Bell calls the “cultural mass.” Jameson seconds this idea, noting that the “immense fragmentation and privatization of modern literature . . . foreshadows deeper and more general tendencies in social life as a whole” (130). This parallel between literature and everyday life can be better understood in light of one of Shattuck’s categories for the “new presentation of the self” after modernism: “the cult of childhood” (Bell 121). If this is correct, then perhaps the desire to merge art and life is nothing more than a
desire to persist in a childlike state in which one is free to eternally don costumes of make-believe. In this way, the individual has no concrete identity; instead, it is ever changing, based upon the costume one wears and not an immutable internal quality. When not even our personal identities are static, there is little possibility that an objective, universal narrative could bind us together as a society. And yet, today's adversary culture has found a way to capitalize on (while furthering) our collective schizophrenia.

At this point, it is important to understand how adversary culture has transformed into its current manifestation. Adversary culture “refers to a discernible and durable reservoir of discontent, a disposition of those Americans who habitually find the United States—or at least its government—as fault in virtually every conflict in which it is engaged and its social institutions irredeemably corrupt” (Hollander 203). Adversary culture breeds discontent and even profits off it. The distrustful attitude of 1960s adversary culture has become its contemporary manifestation's hallmark; we have been transformed into harsh critics of everything American, and our discontent is often voiced without any hope for change.

Somewhere along the line, adversary culture became absorbed by capitalist culture so that discontent is now mass-marketed, which plays nicely into our economic structure. Our mass-marketed discontent can now be quelled by consumerism; whatever might be bothering us can be silenced by purchasing “enjoyment” in the form of material goods. Paradoxically, to purchase the goods capitalist culture tells us we need in order to overcome our discontent, we must forego enjoyment long enough to be able to procure sufficient funds. Although adversary culture is shouting that we should “just do it,” focusing on our individual desires, our economic structure makes such action difficult, unless one abandons the notion of enjoyment through material goods. This is the heart of postmodern schizophrenia: we are constantly being pulled in contradictory directions, and as such, are left in the void between the radical individualism of adversary culture and the conservative collectivism of our economy (Bell 145).

Even though it may appear as if this rampant schizophrenia is the result of eroding master narratives, it is in fact the result of two pervasive, contrary narratives which retain small remnants of traditional values. Tradition, it would seem, is unavoidable. As Hollander explains:

Strong beliefs in the perfectibility of human beings and institutions have for centuries been an essential attribute of the American view of the world, as has an indefatigable optimism regarding the solubility of all social, political, and personal problems. The social critical temper of the adversary culture has always fed on the high expectations that American society has generated and nurtured from its earliest days. (205)
The traditional American master narrative asserted that we live in "the land of dreams," where nothing is impossible; it instructed that any person could come here from any country and live "the American dream." With such high expectations built into our sense of collective identity, adversary culture's disdain is not surprising. Interestingly, a spark of American optimism remains within adversary culture in its attempted marriage of art and life. The traditional master narrative almost encourages us to entertain childhood fancies, which fits neatly into adversary culture's "cult of childhood." It would seem, then, that although adversary culture has structured itself around the antinomian (Bell 123), it has not fully discarded traditional American values.

Another aspect of traditional values that can be detected in today's adversary culture is individualism, although it is undoubtedly more prevalent in postmodernity than in the past. Our traditional master narrative provides an overarching sense of collective identity with hints of individualism. This is apparent in the concept of America as a "melting pot"—our country comprises individuals of many backgrounds, but we are all nonetheless American. The influence of adversary culture has altered the hierarchy, placing our American identity subservient to our individual identities. Adversary culture's inverted hierarchy is indicative of a larger problem, which Bell explains:

Where culture is related to the past, accessibility to culture is shaped by tradition and expressed in ritual. Personal experiences and feelings are . . . irrelevant to the great chain of continuity. But when culture is concerned with the individual personality of the artist, rather than with institutions and laws, then singularity of experience becomes the chief test of what is desirable, and novelty of sensation becomes the main engine of change. (132)

This trend also applies outside the realm of art (if such a distinction is possible, given the blurred line between the artistic and the everyday). When the subjective experience of an individual is valued over objective standards, the only "universality" left is total relativism; there can be no standards for moral or aesthetic judgment, which causes the rift between the master narratives of adversary culture and the economy and leaves us completely ungrounded. According to Žižek, "we 'get more than we bargained for' as the "institutions, customs, and laws" of our society crumble around us (Myers 49-50).

Extreme individualism can be both beneficial and harmful—"the very features of the individual which seem to confer upon it such blessings are also those which blight it. This is because the individual conceived in this way is utterly subjective . . . . There is no objectivity at all." If one agrees with Žižek, there is great freedom in individualism, as the individual is autonomous, and cannot be "impinged upon" (Myers 33). The trouble lies in what Žižek identifies as our need
to be recognized by others in order to have our existence confirmed; the “decentred subject” becomes real “where competing discourses intersect” (Myers 34). In other words, when coexisting with others, our identities can only be fully realized through our interactions with those others. Although we prefer to believe that we are our own independent entities, we also need to be part of a collective. We are only real insofar as we are perceived by those around us.

Clearly, then, we need to be actively engaged with other people to be grounded in some way. When, as adversary culture demands, the individual is so much more important than the group, there is little that remains static in our lives, which only seems to further our collective schizophrenia. Even more troubling is what Žižek sees as the breakdown between the Real and the Symbolic: adversary culture breeds such mass discontent that we are increasingly probing the Real, and are now at a point where we are constantly bombarded with aspects of the Real that make everyday life much less bearable than if we would respect the barrier created through the Symbolic—“we all engage in a minimum of idealization, disavowing the brute fact of the Real in favour of another Symbolic world behind it” (Myers 50).

Although it may appear as if our traditions are disintegrating under the acidic disgust of adversary culture, remnants are still present in our economic structure. Capitalism demands what it always has, for example, productivity and the delay of pleasure. Adversary culture has impinged upon these structures slightly in that its rampant individualism is now marketed in the form of material goods, yet capitalist culture remains anything but antinomian. Nevertheless, when considering the significance of productivity in the capitalist master narrative, postmodern schizophrenia shines through. The individualism stressed by adversary culture and marketed by consumer culture is simply not conducive to productivity; one cannot be both an individual free to pursue his or her desires and a productive member of society at the same time. In order to be productive, it is necessary to submit to authority, suppress individualism, and become a cog in the machinery of capitalism. While advertising affronts us with shouts of “do what feels good,” we know we must suppress our individual desires long enough to earn the money to engage in what we are told are enjoyable activities. The very individualism that seeks to set us free ultimately enslaves us, particularly because individualism has become a mass-marketed commodity.

Now that we are stuck in the gray space between adversary culture and capitalist culture, torn between an existence as isolated individuals or part of a collective, the question yet to be answered is if we will, or even can, ever escape. We appear to be trapped in an endless schizophrenic cycle as long as we subscribe to our conflicting master narratives. There is always the hope that one will eventually triumph over the other and become the solitary narrative we allow to
shape our sense of identity, whether as a whole or as individuals, but when faced with the pervasive discontent of adversary culture, such hopes inevitably fade. As long as we feel compelled to eye everything with distrust and contempt, it is unlikely that any real change can be effected.

The hold of capitalist culture is just as powerful, as it perpetuates the mood of discontent, feeding off of adversary culture as long as it remains marketable. Buying in to capitalism means buying into adversary culture. It would seem, then, that any solution demands either discarding capitalism or adversary culture’s disdain and radical individualism. No “solution” to postmodern schizophrenia seems fully satisfactory, yet there are steps that we can take to minimize the effects of fragmentation. The first and perhaps most difficult challenge to overcome is the loss of hope. Richard Rorty reminds us that we are all equally responsible to work to better our collective situation, arguing that “the difference between early twentieth-century leftist intellectuals and the majority of their contemporary counterparts is the difference between agents and spectators;” we need to reclaim our role in shaping our country, to discard “the spirit of detached spectatorship” (9-11). While aspects of this solution seem tenuous, the sentiment behind his argument is exactly what is needed to move forward, for without any hope for the future, we will be irrevocably trapped in the endless present created by consumerism. The key to Rorty’s stance lies in his acknowledgement that we need to experience both pride and shame on behalf of our nation to be able to effect change:

National pride is to countries what self-respect is to individuals: a necessary condition for self-improvement. Too much national pride can produce bellicosity and imperialism, just as excessive self-respect can produce arrogance. But just as too little self-respect makes it difficult for a person to display moral courage, so insufficient national pride makes energetic and effective debate about national policy unlikely. Emotional involvement with one’s country—feelings of intense shame or of glowing pride aroused by various parts of its history, and by various present-day national policies—is necessary if political deliberation is to be imaginative and productive. Such deliberation will probably not occur unless pride outweighs shame. (3)

For such a shift in our national outlook to occur, it becomes necessary to distance ourselves from the adversarial disgust being thrust at us by the media; we are currently stagnated in self-loathing, and we could certainly benefit from reconciling with the hopeful attitude that characterized the adversary culture of the 1960s. If we fail to regain hope, we will doom ourselves to a lifetime of meaningless cynicism. Although a solution to the problems surrounding us may feel unattainable, simply hoping that life could be different and better can help us to move forward as a society. Perhaps we cannot hope to eradicate schizophrenia entirely, but we
can begin to remove the “value” system that led us to our current predicament.

Part of the problem lies in our epistemology: “how we are obliged to conduct . . . conversations will have the strongest possible influence on what ideas we can conveniently express. And what ideas are convenient to express inevitably become the important content of a culture” (Postman 6). The medium of communication dictates which truths can be expressed, and as such, which truths we value as a society. It is not difficult to see that we are experiencing “the decline of the Age of Typography and the ascendancy of the Age of Television” (Postman 8). What Postman recognizes is our gravitation away from the written word and towards the purely visual; the trouble with this shift is the fragmentation of identity inherent in such media. Stuart Ewen’s “The Dream of Wholeness” addresses this crisis:

In a highly mobile society, where first impressions are important and where selling oneself is the most highly cultivated “skill,” the construction of appearances becomes more and more imperative. If style offers a representation of self defined by surfaces and commodities, the media by which style is transmitted tend to reinforce this outlook in intimate detail. (85)

Visual media such as television present a falsified self, one that masquerades as a unified, flawless ideal we believe we ought to model ourselves after. Consumer culture instructs us to don masks, to aspire to be as fake as the images we are bombarded with on a daily basis: beautiful, shining shells that hide the meaninglessness we feel underneath. In the context of contemporary America, we are being marketed adversarial masks that display our discontent in the socially accepted manner. These masks attempt to fulfill “the dream of wholeness,” but ultimately, they contribute to our schizophrenia (Ewen 87).

A large portion of the problem appears to have originated with the division of labor, particularly in Taylorism:

Taylorism envisioned a society in which there was consolidation and cooperative planning among those who ruled; for those working within the system, it fostered conditions of individuation, social competition, and dependency. Taylor’s dream depended on a population that had been eviscerated of its cultural resources, community bonds, and knowledge of craft. (Ewen 81)

These extreme divisions being implemented in the workplace encouraged the fragmentation of self and discouraged any sense of collectivity, except in that workers were united in their fragmentation. It is little wonder, then, that consumer culture continues to further schizophrenia: it is an inherent part of the system, and has been for more than a century. The next step in seeking to reconcile our sense
of individual and collective identity, then, is to work towards an economic system that doesn't promote fragmentation; the question still remains, however, of how this is to be accomplished.

Considering Neil Postman’s argument that the medium of communication dictates what ideas can be conveyed, it seems possible that we can begin to reclaim a cohesive sense of self and the hope for an economic system devoid of fragmentation by initiating a renaissance of the written word. We have allowed, and even embraced, the aspect of adversary culture that sought to merge art and the everyday; it is time to redefine the boundaries of the two, to reinstate art to its former role as a moral guidepost. We need to reinvigorate the “print-based epistemology” and place less emphasis on the “television-based epistemology [which] has had grave consequences for public life” (24).

Fredric Jameson argues for a new literary form called cognitive mapping; while this may serve to capture the sense of what it is to live in a globalized context, it doesn’t necessarily seek to rectify the problem of schizophrenia. New forms will do little good if we don’t first reestablish a national interest in quality literature. Martha Nussbaum asserts the need to return to the novel to find moral grounding, and this seems the most likely candidate for the reconciliation of individual and collective identities.

She states the novel “is a morally controversial form, expressing in its very shape and style, in its modes of interaction with its readers, a normative sense of life” (Nussbaum 3). As Postman made clear, the written word is capable of conveying truths that are not suited to other media. These days, we look more to television and less to literature for entertainment; this alone should illustrate the lack of substance to be found on television. Fortunately for us, the meaning we are unlikely to obtain through TV still lies in quality novels. If we can somehow minimize our need to be perpetually entertained, and rid ourselves of the misconception that good literature isn’t entertaining, we can reconnect with the stories that are able to give us moral grounding and convey the kinds of truths we need to face.

The trouble with reclaiming the important truths of literature lies in the very feature that makes novels so transformative: their “interest in the ordinary” (Nussbaum 9). The ordinary is not always entertaining, but it does provide a realistic framework through which we can come to crucial decisions, often ones of great moral significance.

If we are to attain a firmer sense of cohesiveness, perhaps we need to be reading novels populated with characters facing similar, but not necessarily identical, circumstances; we need to be “introduce[d] . . . to that which is in a way common and close at hand—but which is often, in its significant strangeness, the
object of profound ignorance and emotional refusal” (Nussbaum 10). Taking up this perspective, if we encounter fragmented characters who lack a clear sense of identity, who are being pulled in conflicting directions by their economic systems and consumer culture, who suffer under the loss of meaning that resulted from the division of labor, we will instinctively respond with sympathy; we will deeply feel the wrongs of such a society, and we will begin to understand the wrongs of our society. The goal, in the end, is that above all, we will feel hope that we can create a better future in which collective schizophrenia no longer exists, or at the very least, does not hold us so firmly in its grip that we cannot hope at all.

Notes

1. “Enjoyment,” in this sense, refers to the intense sensation of pleasure (and sometimes pain) known as jouissance, which Tony Myers defines as “the pleasure beyond mere pleasure itself—a pleasure that has an orgasmic charge, indexing the point where pleasure becomes pain.” It is a sensation to be distinguished from what is normally considered pleasure, one which usually leaves people with a sense of emptiness and drives them in endless pursuit of more jouissance. See Myers 86.

2. The reality that lies beyond the reach of the Symbolic (language).

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Female Happiness in the Patriarchal Cage in Naguib Mahfouz’s Cairo Trilogy

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Naguib Mahfouz, the 1988 Nobel Laureate in literature, is probably the best known and most celebrated modern author in Egypt and in the Arabic speaking countries of the Middle East. His literary production comprises more than forty titles, the majority of which are novels and novelettes and there are eleven volumes of short stories among his works. He was born in 1911 in Cairo and he studied philosophy at the University of Cairo from 1930-1934 where he stayed a further four years to prepare an M.A. thesis on Aesthetics. Mahfouz grew up in a solid family environment. Mahfouz states himself: “I grew up in a stable family. The atmosphere around me was one which inspired the love of parents and family...The family was a basic, almost sacred, value of my childhood; I was not one of those who rebelled against their parents or rejected their authority” (qtd. in El-Enany, 1993). In 1938 he left the University, became a civil servant and published his first collection of short stories. He remained in the civil service since that time until he was pensioned and died on August 30th, 2006 at the age of ninety four.

His work has been the subject of many studies.
Fatma Moussa-Mahmoud in her article “The Outsider in The Novels of Naguib Mahfouz” stated that his novels depict alienated characters that cannot find themselves in the Egyptian middle-class society (1981). Nijland (1984) wrote about the depiction of Islam in some of his novels and concluded that Mahfouz wanted to show through his novels that “social intent and religion have become the cornerstones of the earthly paradise.” Furthermore, Judy (2007) pointed out focusing on Kamal’s character in Naguib’s Trilogy that the latter signifies secular humanism which could be illustrated in the following question “How can one live a virtuous fulfilling life without faith?” Moreover, Allegretto-Diiulio (2007) using the four subcategories of sexuality, domestic servitude, spirituality, and intellectuality, investigated the theme of female entrapment in Mahfouz’s major novels. In addition, Ali (2012) presented images of the Colonizer and the Colonized in Naguib Mahfouz’s The Cairo Trilogy. The purpose of this study is to argue that Naguib Mahfouz in the following novels: Midak Alley, Miramar and the Cairo Trilogy showed how women’s joy of living cannot be attained except in the patriarchal cage of marriage that best fits their needs.

The Cairo Trilogy (1956-57) is regarded as Mahfouz’s central work of the 1950s and considered the best epic novel ever written in Arabic. It is interesting to note here Edward Said’s (1983) words when he mentioned that “texts are wordly, to some degree they are events, and even when they appear to deny it, they are nevertheless a part of the social world, human life, and of course the historical moments in which they are located and interpreted.” This is quite apparent in Naguib's Trilogy, as it takes the form of an eyewitness examination of Egypt between the two World Wars and narrates the historical changes that befell the Egyptian society over that period. Each book of The Trilogy is named after a street in the old city of Cairo: Palace Walk, Palace of Desire, and Sugar Street. The three parts of The Trilogy is a family saga that narrates the events of a Cairene middle class family over a period of thirty years, from 1917 to 1940s. It follows a merchant family from its prime before and during World War I, through the dislocation after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, through the rise of both colonialism and nationalism, up to the brink of World War II.

Amina is the central character in the Cairo Trilogy that connects the
narrative in the three novels and she is a role model for domesticity, obedience and submission. It is noteworthy to give a brief historical review of the traditional family in ancient Egypt, as Margot Badran (1995) states in Feminists, Islam, and Nation, “in ancient Egypt at the height of its glory women had enjoyed equal rights with men, but when the country fell under foreign domination women lost their rights…which in time, these rights had been eroded.” Moreover, according to Algretto-Diiulio (2007), Western patriarchy may have been exported to Egypt during the British occupation. It is important to understand that Mahfouz depicted in some of his novels how society wanted to imprison women in a patriarchal mold that cannot be easily rejected. By using the cult of domestic confinement women are kept contained and subordinate. Huda Sharawy (1995) argued in Pharaonic Egypt and early Islam that women enjoyed equal rights which was eroded by foreign domination.

With regards to domesticity before the nineteenth century, according to Joan Williams (2001) in Unbending Gender, parents used to share the domestic work together as they planted their own food, made their clothing, took care of their children while they both stayed at home. In other words, women in the past enjoyed equality and domesticity was practiced by both genders until men created patriarchal cages and women accepted their new roles. Mary Wollstonecraft “warned that there would be neither freedom nor peace as long as women were barred from free and rational thought by domestic domination, because submission to a singular command in marriage…obstructs ambition, creating instead extravagance, vice, and uselessness” (qtd. in Goodman, 2004). In other words, domesticity becomes first priority in married women’s life leaving them neither space nor time for other goals to be accomplished outside family concerns.

Mahfouz depicted the life of the protagonist Amina unfolding largely within the domestic domain, where her role is primarily that of a wife and mother. What motivates this woman to seek and accept this role along the social identity that it entails, is that in Mahfouz’s opinion it gives her fulfilment and happiness. Richard A. Easterlin (2003) in his article “Explaining Happiness” made an analysis and concluded his article by stating that spending more time with one’s family is consistent with greater happiness and this is what Mahfouz wants us to see in the Cairo Trilogy. It is Amina’s entrapment in domestic servitude that gives her the joy of living. For example her waking up at night which ‘she has learned …along
with other rules of married life" (Mahfouz, 1990). She felt that in spite of the fact that it disturbed her sleep and made her perform extra chores that should have ceased by the end of the day, Mahfouz mentions that "She even profoundly loved this hour of waiting up...[as] it continued to be the living symbol of her affection for her spouse". It showed how she was dedicated to making him happy. In other words, Mahfouz is stating that she was expected to obey her husband who was portrayed as a master and never criticise his behaviour. In their first year of marriage, when she just tried to object to his continuous nights out, his answer was "I am a man. I'm the one who commands and forbids. I will not accept any criticism of my behaviour" (Mahfouz, 1990).

This patriarchal cage set fixed rules for a woman's demeanor namely that they should be constantly obedient and should surrender to their husbands as a slave would behave towards his/her master. However, Mahfouz made it a point to portray Amina thinking back over her past married life and seeing that since she has children, a home abundantly provided and a happy adult life then she has all what is needed to enjoy life. Mahfouz showed Amina feeling happy despite the fact that she was serving her husband as a slave would serve his master. For example, having always a basin and pitcher for her husband's feet whenever he returns home, helping him undress, standing by and not sharing a meal with him nor with her sons, and remaining imprisoned at home with no free time for leisure except during the coffee hour when all members of the family except the father gathered before sunset to enjoy being together and to have a pleasant chat. When she was bedridden for three weeks, on the first day of her recovery "she hopped out of bed with a youthful nimbleness derived from her joy." She went about her morning work "with indescribable happiness" (Mahfouz, 1990). When her husband banishes her from his house as a punishment for going out without permission and she stays for a while with her mother, she feels extremely unhappy and intoxicated as if she were a fish which is removed from water. When her sons go to bring her back home "she lowered her eyes to hide her overwhelming joy...she was transported by joy" (Mahfouz, 1990). Every day when she bids her husband and sons goodbye Mahfouz draws the attention of the reader of her emotions then "This moment was one of the happiest of the mother's day" (Mahfouz, 1990). It is somewhat ironic as one would question the reasons behind her happiness which could be because the pressure of the patriarchal dictator would cease for a while with all the immediate domestic chores that she is expected to perform during his presence. Amina when Kamal was unhappy that his sister Aisha was married and that Khadija was also going to be married, his mother says "happiness has a price" (Mahfouz, 1990). Then that evening Mahfouz mentioned
that “Amina was kept awake by her happiness as though by brilliant moonlight.” It seems as though Mahfouz here is emphasising the relationship between marriage and female happiness which Amina felt knowing that her eldest daughter was going to be married. When Amina’s husband or ‘master’ as she refers to him dies, she states that “Now that my master has left this house, it’s no longer the place I called home for more than fifty years… This world is no longer any concern of mine.” (Mahfouz, 1990).

This happiness that Amina feels contradicts with what Fatima Mernissi (1987), in her study of gender inequality in the Muslim system, claims when she states that “modern Muslim societies have to face the fact that the traditional family mutilates women by depriving them of their humanity.” It is imperative to examine the reasons behind this patriarchal cage that men created for women. Mahfouz being a Moslem believed in the submission to Allah, and since submission is a strong characteristic of this religion as indicated in the Surah 49:14 of the Qur’an that emphasises this ideal: “You have not believed until you say, ‘We have submitted ourselves!’” it is reasonable to infer how this submission is transported to the female gender in the patriarchal society (Allegreto-Diullio, 2007). It is important to note here that female submission is also required in Christianity and is what brides are advised to uphold towards their husbands on their wedding day. Wendy McElroy (1996) believed that domestic servitude was mainly behind women’s historic subjection to patriarchal obedience rather than to a cooperative effort to build family. In other words she claims that family is what ‘breeds patriarchy.’ With that said, it becomes natural to see a character like Amina in Mahfouz’s Trilogy and to expect her to feel happy with her married life, as this is the normal attitude that is expected of females at that time. Amina, as El-Anany (1993) pointed out is the representative of a culture that at the beginning of the century was not only almost totally religiously oriented, but happy to be so and unaware of an alternative. Amina definitely believes she lives a good life, as she rejects the idea that she is offended or controlled. Mary Talbot (2005) argues that “the constant identification of women as victims is, to put it mildly, depressing” and “victim status can be damaging.” In other words, if women see themselves entirely as victims through the lens of the oppressor and allow themselves to be viewed that way by others, they become debilitated and depressed. Amina enjoys her patriarchal cage, avoids drawing attention to herself as a victim, and gradually builds a bond of resilience witnessed and respected by her children and even the neighbourhood women who refer to Amina as “the bee…in recognition of her incessant perseverance and energy” (Mahfouz, 1990). Kamal, Amina’s son, envied the peaceful life of his mother and sisters and wished that he was born a female,
as “he got bored at times and felt so disgusted with work and discipline that he envied his mother and sisters their ignorance and the rest and peace they enjoyed”. In Sugar Street Amina is allowed to go out freely and visit the Al-Husayn mosque to pray for her husband AlSayyid’s health as he is sick and his patriarchal rules of house entrapment is somewhat loosened. It is important to understand that Amina who was punished earlier for going out without permission, is given a type of freedom that she could not exercise when she was young. This approval could be due to the fact that her husband felt that those visits may be fruitful and lead to his recovery.

The Cairo Trilogy also portrayed other female characters like Amina's daughters Khadiga and Aisha who were also influenced by patriarchy but in different degrees. Khadiga took after her mother Amina in performing all her domestic and family duties feeling happy and proud of herself. It is noteworthy to highlight here that it is through the mother that patriarchy with its conventional expectations is transferred to the daughter (Leiden, 2011). This type of mothering, which transmits to the daughter a legacy of victimization and exploitation rather than of equality and worthiness, is rejected by Rich (1986) as he believes that it is fundamentally deficient: “The anxious pressure of one female on another to conform to a degrading and dispiriting role can hardly be termed ‘mothering,’ even if she does this believing it will help her daughter to survive.” Mahfouz nevertheless, showed how time has an impact on different generations as Khadiga battles with her mother-in-law until she is allowed to have her own kitchen. Mahfouz describes Khadiga as being ugly, energetic, responsible and useful which are all characteristics that he believes should be in a married lady. He therefore makes her survive and the reader feels her happiness even though he does not state so in words like in the case of Amina.

In contrast, Aisha was Kadiga’s foil, as she believed that since the moment she married, she became an aristocrat and she told her sister Khadiga that ‘Aristocrats don’t work’ (Mahfouz, 1990). That flighty, carefree Aisha is obsessed with her beauty and finds that the life of a mother is not carefree, so she opts for leaping outside of the patriarchal female cage but the author punishes her for neglecting domesticity and she is deprived of her husband and all her children for choosing this path. Moreover, she is not interested in housework “all of which may appear to the ordinary eye to be sins of a venial nature, but not according to
the stern ethics of Mahfouz” (Enany, 1993). She behaves like men when she starts smoking with her father-in-law after the death of her husband and two sons. Mahfouz illustrated that “She appeared in the midst of the family like a beautiful but useless symbol” (Mahfouz, 1990). Her remaining daughter Naima who takes after her mother and is always singing and useless died in childbirth leaving Aisha grief stricken and heart broken. Aisha adopting this lifestyle is in total defiance to the conventional portrait of women. Mahfouz thus appears to be giving us a moral lesson which is that if a female dared to think that her quest for happiness will be found outside the patriarchal female cage that was pre-set for her, she will be punished by fate.

Unlike docile Amina, Hamida is a brand of fire, an angry, rebellious girl. She is the protagonist in Midaq Alley (1975) and is a case in point as she was a female who did not fit the patriarchal image that was pre-set which included marriage, housework and children as Mahfouz pointed out that “her inordinate desire for clothes stirred within her, as did her fierce dislike of children, for which the alley women reproached her” (Mahfouz, 1992). “All the barber could possibly give her was one of those wretched marriages and the inevitable pregnancies and children, giving birth to them on the sidewalks among the flies, and with all the other hateful ugliness of the picture… Yes, she had no desire for motherhood as was the case with so many other girls” and the women in the alley accused her of being abnormal. The fixed stereo-type of a female should not crave power and wealth as these are male objectives. However, these were Hamida’s dreams and when Abbas promised to provide her with a luxurious home, she felt happy as “that gleam of light she so wanted might come from him and answer her craving for power and wealth.” Hamida had also a spirit of rebelliousness which did not fit the passive model of the patriarchal female image. Also, if a female worked in a factory, she was accused of being like a man, as if working was solely for men because that is how the patriarchal image sees the gender roles in society. To Hamida marriage meant home confinement “exhausting her with the duties of a wife, housekeeper and mother; all tasks she knew she was not created for. Hamida’s infatuation with jewelry, fine clothes and make-up, leads her to become lured by a pimp called Faraj who turns her into the prostitute Titi and takes her away from the alley that she hates. Faraj wisely asks Hamida if she will one day become “one of those alley brides” that get pregnant and have “children on the sidewalk, with flies, everywhere, only beans to eat” because he knows she will be reminded of her poverty “She was resigned to her fate; nevertheless, she wondered where happiness lay” (Mafouz, 1992). Yet, when she was able to get all the expensive clothes she desired, she was not as happy as she thought she would
be especially when there was no love in her life. Hamida confesses to Abbas at the end that she is unhappy and that she is “paying for it with ...(her) flesh and blood”. This was for hating her life in the alley and opting for another life. Hamida achieved her dreams of clothes, jewellery, money and men which gave her power, but she could never have attained these unless she takes the role of a prostitute.

In other words, the patriarchal assigned gender role should never be broken or else the female gender becomes evil, immoral and disdained by society. Thus, Kamal A. Elsaadany’s (1999) views in his article “The study of the literary discourse in the Novels of Naguib Mahfouz” are open to doubt, as he claims that Mahfouz portrays gender in such a way that disfavours the conservative or religious and encourages ‘libertinism’ which allows the practice of sex. Kamal’s evidence is Mahfouz’s constant portrayal of prostitutes in a lot of his novels. Nevertheless, it is obvious that Mahfouz shows us the painful side of their life and how they regret taking that path as with the case of Hamida in Midaq Alley and the prostitute Zubayda in The Cairo Trilogy who in Sugar Street is depicted trying to get another loan from Al-Sayyid Ahmed as she is in need of money. Mahfouz made it a point to show how Zubayda suffered as he pointed out that “her body seemed bloated, and her face was veiled by cosmetics. There was no trace of the gold jewellery that had once decorated her neck, wrists, and ears and nothing remained of her former beauty” (Mahfouz, 1990).

It is imperative to note here that Mahfouz wanted also to display the changes that were taking place in Egypt at that time. In 1928, Qasim Amin, who was an early advocate of women’s rights called for women’s equality and encouraged the society to enter professional lives and to enjoy the quality of life pre-ordained by men which is what Hamida in Midaq Alley failed to do because she was not educated and did not have a profession. The idea that if a female learnt a profession, she would not have to be pressed to get married and she could wait and get “married when and whomever she wished, or perhaps she might never have married at all” as Hamida realizes before she becomes a prostitute (Mahfouz, 1992). So, it is either work or marriage and when working a female in the patriarchy image would be like a man. This idea also appeared in Sugar Street as Naima Aisha’s daughter complains to her mother and grandmother that she wanted to complete her educations as “all girls study today, just like boys” (Mahfouz, 1990). Amina does not share her granddaughter’s opinion as she believes that those girls who get a certificate do so because they “can’t find a bridegroom” (Mahfouz, 1990). However, Aisha who belongs to a different generation agrees with her daughter and would have wished to have given her the chance to finish her education...
which would save her somehow from domestic servitude. It is interesting to note that in making a female not educated and thus unable to work, she will always need to get married and depend on the male which is what patriarchy is seeking to achieve namely to stereo type genders and keep each in the sphere that was regulated for him/her.

Moving on to the third novel Miramar (1967) Mahfouz’s protagonist is Zohra the peasant girl who ran away from her parents and worked seeking to be educated like the rest of the girls who go to school and learn some profession. She also rebelled and refused to marry the man who was chosen for her and stated “they wanted to sell me”. She refused to go back home mentioning she was working an “honest work” (Mahfouz, 1978). Her refusal to marry this suitor was due to the fact that he mentioned that he thought women were like “animals without brains or religion, and the only way to keep them from going wild is to leather them every day!”. This feeling of being a second hand citizen engulfs Zohra as she asks Amer “Do you consider me your equal as a human being?” (Mahfouz, 1978). She refuses to live with Monsieur Amer Bey without marriage and her inner feeling is that she despises her because she has no family, education nor money. Zohra here was seeking marriage which was what Hamida detested. Although Zohra loves Amer Bey and he declared his love towards her too, but he refuses to marry her as this would create problems for him due to their belonging to different classes. It is interesting to note that she refers to marriage as a magic wand that will make her a woman. The word woman here is as if her humanity cannot exist without marriage which is in stark contrast with what Hamida strives for and believes. When Amer mentions that “love is stronger than everything”, she argues “Everything except your problems” which shows that she does not take his words at face value without thinking critically about their meaning. Mahfouz makes the reader listen to Amer Bey while he speaks with Zohra and equates her happiness with finding a man and getting married. Zohra’s dream is to become educated and have a profession which in her opinion will free her from the patriarchal cage of dependency and submission. Mahfouz is again hammering on the same idea of marriage as being the only path for female happiness, while he is clearly sceptic of female education and profession as factors that would truly lead to happiness as he thinks that the latter could only be achieved in the patriarchal cage.

In conclusion, Mahfouz in The Cairo Trilogy, Midaq Alley and Miramar
emphasised the idea that women can only find happiness in marriage inside the patriarchal cage if they followed the code of conduct which is obedience and submission to their spouses together with taking full responsibility of domesticity and child care. Today's working women toil at work and have a second shift when they return home. They do not have the time to prepare meals or raise children as their predecessors had. Wolfers and Stevenson (2009) stated that women's happiness has declined if compared to men and this has mainly occurred in the industrialized world. So the question that Mahfouz appears to be asking is could home be women's best place?

Works Cited


Human Ecology in New York City: The Poetry Project’s Cultural Ecosystem

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“...I propose to start, and to end, with the question of the human (as if there were any other way for us to start or end!).” —Judith Butler

Perhaps the easiest or most conventional way to think about the earth or the natural is within the binary which pits it against the human, or culture. One way this tension manifests in conventional discourse is the opposition of country to city. The country has nature, whereas the city supposedly does not; rather, the city is filled with the unnatural: pollution, late capitalism, and overall anthropocentrism. It is thus easy to assume that ecological thinking must be concerned with the countryside—where humans are scarce and “nature” abounds—and not the city—where, in contrast, humans and culture are clustered in claustrophobic density. Timothy Morton provides a way out of such anti-urban (anti-human) ecological thinking with his theorization of “the mesh” and his deconstruction of Nature: “the ecological thought is about people—it is people” (Morton 77). More interesting, however, from a literary point of view, is the way out of conventional ecological thinking that experimental poetry provides—a poetic practice which, espoused by New York School poets such as Frank O’Hara, engendered and which is continuously re-engendered by The Poetry Project at St. Mark’s Church in-the-Bowery.
Founded in 1966 upon the “local environment” or “matrix” which the New York School poets provided, the Poetry Project is a fundamentally cultural or human project that manifests ecology—working, not being theorized about—in the heart of downtown Manhattan (Waldman 4). The physical space it occupies, which connects the organic and the unnatural, the living and the dead, as well as (and largely through) the poetry for which it is a platform, are part of the humanist ecological narrative of the Poetry Project. William Rueckert, while theorizing how ecology can speak to literary studies, codifies poems and imaginative creation as sources of energy (Rueckert 108-109). Poems provide the energy on which a dynamic cultural ecosystem operates on 10th Street and 2nd Avenue (nearly) every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday night—an ecosystem which recycles a religious space to create a humanist space, and which uses this environment to effect the conservation of culture, of community—of the human. The Poetry Project at St. Mark’s Church in-the-Bowery, as a text, if humanistic in content, is ecological in form; while concerned with the human, it does ecology—from within the quintessential urban landscape, New York City—in a way that is essentially human. Reconciling nature and culture, the ecological and the human, it is a counter-institution, a movement of human ecological activism.

Isaac and/or the Earth

The tension between nature and culture has long permeated discourses across disciplinary lines. In 1966, Allen Ginsberg writes, “In the country getting up with the cows and birds hath Blakean charm, in the megalopolis the same nature’s hour is a science-fiction hell vision, even if you’re a milkman” (How Kaddish Happened 127). While “megalopolis,” or New York City, is here part of the “same nature” as “the country,” it is the terrifying opposite of the pastoral, a stand-in green image of the world outside of urban corruption. “The country,” or nature, is a fantasy—one that could not be further away from the reality of the city. What Ginsberg voices here is not (only) the frustration of a (neo-)Romantic (Beat) stuck in Manhattan; he echoes in poetic prose the dynamic tension between city and country, culture and nature, which shapes much contemporary artistic and theoretical discourse. On one end of the ontological spectrum stands virginal earth, and on the other stands the human and its creations; on the one hand, the earth calls for attention, and on the other, the human calls for it.

While thinking along binaries is never a completely safe approach, the coexistence of (immediately apparent) ecological crisis and the perennial gamut of human troubles (war, institutional racism, sexism, etc.) presents an ethical problem of responsibility. Ought art, and/or the critical (-coded) discourse which it engenders, do ecology, or do the human? The decision to talk about one may very well be the active decision to not talk about the other, as the commonplace
critique of anthropocentrism—and the moniker “post-humanities,” under which things loosely labeled ecocriticism (/ecopoetics) often fall—might suggest. Jacques Derrida codifies this problem of responsibility in his reading of the biblical dilemma of Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac: “I cannot respond to the call, the request, the obligation, or even the love of another without sacrificing the other other, the other others” (The Gift 69). The dismissal of other choices in the selection of one option is not passive; the decision to respond to one call is the active decision to not answer another one.

Abraham’s problem of responsibility, which is nothing extraordinary, but rather “the most common thing,” is (always) at play when we, scholars and artists alike, attempt to decide what it is we want to talk about, and why (68). Put more simply, “When we look at x, we can’t look at y” (Morton 22). Thinking of the human—humans, their productions, and their problems—as distinct from something called Nature, makes an x of one and a y of the other. Timothy Morton’s brand of “dark” rather than “deep” ecology, “the ecological thought” (codified in his text of the same name) seeks to think past conventional notions of Nature and the environment. The “mesh,” or the “interconnectedness of all living and non-living things,” the cornerstone of the ecological thought, effectively deconstructs the nature/culture binary (28). The mesh conflates everything in the ontological spectrum—everything in-between and including the ultimately synthetic and the ultimately organic—into a nuanced understanding of what concerns and composes ecology. Morton remarks that “one of the greatest obstacles to the ecological thought” is “the sign saying, ‘No anthropocentrism,’ a “sign” signifying an anti-human tendency that “is itself humanism,” that “is anthropocentrism” (75-76). Rather than think of the human as a special entity, separate from nature (on nature), it is more accurate and more fruitful to conceive of the human as part of nature, in nature, or as nature.

All of what is traditionally conceived of as “Nature” is, in fact, culture—and culture is, in turn, nature. Humans—as creators—are shapers or synthesizers of matter like any other animal; a bridge or skyscraper is no different from, no less natural than a beaver’s dam or a spider’s web. The notion of creativity as inherent or part of “human (animal) nature” is certainly problematic; nonetheless, creation, as the re-shaping of pre-existing matter, is by no means distinctly human/cultural or ‘unnatural.’ Whereas Morton’s thinking more obviously opens up and argues for discussions of personhood for the non-human, it also disarms the anti-humanist current in ecological thinking, making discourse about the human one variety of discourse about nature. The addition of a whole range of non-human objects and life forms to the umbrella term “people” or “persons” does not subtract humans from the same category, after all. Granting agency and attention to non-
humans need not necessitate that we take it away from humans. Within Morton’s framework, talk about nature, or the non-human, does not need to supersede talk about the human. The way out of the binary, then, of Abraham’s dilemma, of Ginsberg’s “hell vision,” is the mesh.

To take the mesh seriously means to understand that the ‘concrete jungle’ of New York City is not the polar opposite of Nature; it is Nature. Thus, in contrast with Ginsberg, whose rhetoric upholds the country/city dichotomy, we might look to Frank O’Hara, whose Meditations in an Emergency anticipates the ecological thought, making the city the site of ecological thinking:

I have never clogged myself with the praises of pastoral life, nor with nostalgia for an innocent past of perverted acts in pastures. No. One need never leave the confines of New York to get all the greenery one wishes—I can’t even enjoy a blade of grass unless I know there’s a subway handy, or a record store or some other sign that people do not totally regret life. (Meditations 197)

Rather than reminisce about a Nature diametrically opposed to the city, and lament one’s actual environment, O’Hara illustrates how the ecological thought surpasses the ‘perverse’ Romantic urge of conventional environmentalism. The subway, the record store, and everything else that makes up Manhattan, are as much a part of the “greenery” of earth as “a blade of grass” (197). O’Hara thus thinks the mesh, thinks the ecological thought, before Morton theorizes it. Poetry of, from, for, and/or about New York City—New York School poetry, nominally—thus thinks the mesh. It is ecological for, not in spite of, its enmeshed celebration of the human.

The Enmeshed Project

O’Hara’s anticipation of the mesh and Morton’s dark ecology is the foundation for The Poetry Project—it is as central to the enmeshed narrative of the Project as O’Hara himself is. In her introduction to Out of This World, an encyclopedic anthology of Project writings she edited, Anne Waldman (former artistic director of the Project) writes that “The New York School shaped the ‘local environment’ through literary and art magazines, readings, openings, and parties and provided, in a sense, the matrix for The Poetry Project” (Waldman 4).

The understanding possessed by O’Hara and the New York School, that the city is nature, which is indeed the historical framework upon/from which the Project was erected, also provides the linguistic “matrix” which allows “literary and art magazines” and other cultural events to signify “the local environment” (4, my emphasis). In his foreword to the same anthology, Ginsberg notes that “The Green Revolution” found a voice in avant-garde poetry “before scientific popular notions of ecology became majority opinion” (Foreword xxix). The human ecology of The Poetry Project, however, has less to do with nominally environmental
poetry occurring within it, and more to do with its enmeshed narrative as an
environment, a cultural eco-system—a narrative of which the Project's poetry,
history, and physical space are all parts.

In the courtyard of St. Mark’s Church in-the-bowery, home of The Poetry
Project since 1966, three “flourishing trees” stand, surrounded by concrete—
three trees, dedicated on April 30, 1975, to the memory of poets W.H. Auden
(a parishioner of St. Mark’s), Paul Blackburn (founder of the Project), and Frank
O’Hara (Waldman 6). Poking out of the concrete, bringing the dead into contact
with the living, the past with the present, and culture (poets) with nature (the
vegetable), these trees are one micro-cosmic stanza or passage in the enmeshed
narrative of The Poetry Project. The architectural space it inhabits meshes together
the unnatural elements of the city and the natural, blurring the distinction
between the two. Similarly, Lee Ann Brown, long-time Project regular and
former director of the Monday night reading series, begins Warm and Fragrant
Mangoes, Thirty Calla Lilies remarking that “Windows with warped glass make the
sidewalk look like water” (Brown 431). While Brown’s poem evokes imagery of San
Francisco, its first line might easily be about Manhattan, broadly, or (the blocks
surrounding) St. Mark’s Church, specifically. The “warped glass” of old windows
channels the urban legend that glass flows like a liquid, a phenomenon that
permeates the city, thereby coding it (“mak[ing] it look”) natural. Likewise, the
trees in the church’s courtyard do not discontinue the narrative of ‘concrete jungle’
they occur within; rather, they are coded cultural, as much a part of it as the bricks
of the church. Thus, the Project enmeshes the city and nature: windows, water,
concrete, and trees.

Waldman evokes the image of the memorial trees at the very end of her
introduction to Out of This World, ending her essay with a transcription of the
plaque which accompanies (literally contextualizes) the trees, itself a quotation
of Auden: “Thousands have lived without love, not one without water” (qtd. in
Waldman 6). “Thousands” is ambiguous in one sense, since it might refer to trees
or to humans—but, more positively, it is multiple: neither has lived without water,
and the enigmatic line talks about both trees and humans. Their convergence in
the word “thousands” speaks to the breakdown of sharp distinctions between
nature and culture the Project embodies. “Water,” on Brown’s mind as she gazes
at windows, and here essential to (human/vegetable) life, is also an appropriate
last word to segue into Waldman’s collection of Project poetry; the way to think of
the poems that follow might be the way Auden thinks of water at the end of First
Things First. On one level, the poems which immediately succeed Auden’s words
are those of the Project’s precursors; the poems/ poets who provided the “matrix”
for the project are as essential to it as water is to a tree or human. On the adjacent
On a broader scale, Waldman’s “water” segue might make the claim that poetry is as essential to life, human and otherwise (in a thing called reality, not the imaginative world of metaphor), as is water. Such a move echoes William Rueckert’s eco-critical theorization of poems as “stored energy,” which codifies them as “a verbal equivalent of fossil fuel,” and “a part of the energy pathways which sustain life” (Rueckert 108). Rueckert, like O’Hara, sees poems as things in the world, analogous to green plants, on the one hand “models for energy flow,” but on the other hand actual sources of energy that is contracted by “coming together in the classroom, in the lecture hall, in the seminar room (anywhere, really) to discuss or read or study literature” (110-111). Poems and the discourse communities around them, according to Rueckert, are like non-entropic ecosystems in which the energy that flows is not expended—it “cannot be used up” (108). That is, the use of energy to mobilize or do something does not exhaust the source energy; it is still equally utilizable elsewhere. The Poetry Project is precisely this kind of inexhaustible energy source—Don Yorty, perhaps speaking on behalf of very many Project regulars, remarks that “St. Mark’s is a place to recharge my batteries in, an Oasis” (Yorty 688). Whereas Rueckert points this efficiency out to mark the “human world” as distinct from the “natural world,” the fact of poems existing as textual objects in the world, as well as events in time and space makes them part of a real ecosystem—or economy of energy—in nature which does, in fact, operate efficiently.

Rueckert himself uses “energy” in a rather poetic sensibility, since the output of a poem, regardless of its power, cannot (yet) enable a car or a refrigerator to run. This is not to say, however, that the Project’s energy does not produce anything. With the appropriate critical fear of revisionism, it is difficult to say that a(ny) given situation or institution (positively) caused some creative event to occur; nevertheless, no less influential a poet than Kenneth Koch remarks that [St. Mark’s] has been a means of raising standards, of making some poems better than they’d otherwise have been, even of causing certain poems to exist. I imagine I’m not the only poet who’s worked hard on a poem or written a new one because of having a reading there, or who’s gotten some new ideas from having done so. (Koch 651)

Koch’s “imagined” situation is far from false, as very many of the statements about the Project Out of This World collects echo a similar, if not the same, sentiment (Waldman 614-690). He might earn the poetic license to speak on causality here not by his stature as a literary figure, but rather the modesty of
his claims: the Project affects “some poems,” “certain poems,” “a poem,” “some ideas” (651, my emphasis) This is not the blanket language of purple journalism; rather, Koch’s checked words hint at a poet behind them with actual, particular poems/instances in mind. Keeping in mind that poems are things which exist (physically) in the world, if the Project has caused at least one to exist—more than a fair assumption, considering the statements as well as the tome of Project writings which houses them—then it is indeed a productive (in the conventional sense of the word) institution, a counter-institution of energy-efficient production.

Another principle at work in Rueckert’s essay is his insistence that “What a poem is saying is probably always less important than what it is doing and how—in the deep sense—it coheres” (Rueckert 110). In this way, what is important about the poetry of the Project is the exchange of energy—the productive ecosystem—which it sets in motion. It is interesting, however, that Rueckert leaves the performance or witnessing thereof performed poetry out of his discussion of human ecologies. A large portion of the Project’s history might more easily fall under the umbrella of “classroom…lecture hall…seminar room,” or pedagogical apparatuses Rueckert mentions, as workshops have been a part of the Project’s narrative since its inception (Champion). However, the power of performed poetry “was at the heart of the plan” of the Project, as Waldman remarks that it was essential to the naming of it: “we…and in mind the sense of an outward projecting, ‘to direct one’s voice to be heard clearly at a distance’” (Waldman 4). In a real way, what the performances of poems are doing in St. Mark’s Church is enacting the coherence of the mesh. Involvement in the Project is thus participation in an economy of efficiency, “a raising of the energy levels which makes it possible for the highest motives of literature to accomplish themselves. These motives are not pleasure and truth, but creativity and community” (Rueckert 111). If this end is indeed human in content—which does not take away from its ecological importance—it is ecological in form.

Recycling, Conservation, and Human Ecology

Inside the community room of St. Mark’s Church in-the-bowery, on Wednesday, January 18th, 2012, a crowd of people sits silently as a man at a podium in the front of the room speaks to them, reading from his notes and heavily dog-eared book, and improvising comments and jokes in-between readings. The chairs in which they are seated are arranged in two rectangular formations, not unlike the pews inside the main sanctuary of the church; likewise, the people sitting in them listen in attentive silence, and a fervor that mirrors that of an ideal Mass hangs in the air. The man at the podium is not a priest, however, and the audience is composed not of traditional parishioners, but rather the regulars of The Poetry Project—among them, several of New York’s most
prominent poets, Lower East Side locals, students, and myself. The man at the podium on this particular Wednesday is a poet named Tom Savage, and his message, while largely spiritual and human(ist), is a far cry from the conventional language of the Christian Mass. The reading is framed by the outward signs of the sanctuary, however, and therefore “its exterior form would be that of a rupture and a redoubling” thereof the Mass (Derrida, Structure 278).

Whereas Derrida’s language here specifically refers to the enigmatic “event” “in the history of the concept of structure,” it also describes the deconstructive project on the whole, the ‘double intention’ Derrida locates in Levi-Strauss’s project, “to preserve as an instrument something whose truth value [one] criticizes” (278, 284). The Project’s use of the Mass paradigm, as bricolage, or the adaptive use of materials “already there,” is indeed deconstructive (285). However, another way of framing this deconstruction is to conceive of the “rupture and redoubling” as a recycling—a productive re-use that turns the Christian space into an artspace, and an artspace which promotes its own religion of human ecology.

Savage, like every other poet who has performed work at St. Mark’s, as well as the Project itself, recycles the Christian symbols and space, shifting its center to a secular (in his case) humanist end. One of the poems Savage performs is The Last Bamiyan Poem, an anti-war testament in the voice of the

...Bamiyan Buddhas,
Those thousand year old standing Buddhas
Carved out of a cliff in Bamiyan, Afghanistan
When it was an ancient empire called Bactria.
The Talibans blew us up four years ago. (Savage 70)

Stylistically, the narration from the voice of (non-existent) statues echoes Morton’s opening up of personhood to the non-human and even non-living. On another level, the statues, like the Project, “are or were” enmeshed objects/spaces, coded both natural, “carved out of a cliff”—“so-called inanimate stone”—and cultural—“idols” (70). They are also representations of the human, literally, as they were modeled on Siddhartha Gautama (72). As hills-made-human are the voice and subject matter of Savage’s poem, it is (in pretense) by and about the mesh. Interestingly, the statues “are happy to not ‘be’ anymore” and to have “achieved perfect nonbeing,” although Savage’s largely elegiac poem might suggest an ironic element to their celebration (70-71). They do, however, decry the war that has rendered them “rubble, as much of/ The Muslim world may be rendered soon” (71). Their objections to the war take the form of enmeshed, human ecology. The “Muslim world,” which faces catastrophe, is not the virginal nature of conventional ecology; it is the human-inflected combination of the physical environment and the humans living in and on it. Further, the statues lament that
Now poor Afghanistan is so full of landmines
American, Russian, and weapons
Left over from twenty-five years of war
That it almost isn’t fit to breathe in anymore. (72)

The irony of this passage, beyond statues being concerned about breathing, is that what they lament is the change of landscape or environment in “poor Afghanistan.” This is ironic because the addition of land mines and weapons to an otherwise natural landscape is, in a devastatingly literal way, a part of the same narrative which brought the statues to be: cultural/human interaction and tampering with nature, that phenomenon which so much conventional ‘green’ thinking decryes as emphatically as the statues do war.

However, what the statues lament, in this central passage and in the poem more broadly, is not the effect the war has upon the planet (as divorced from the human), but rather the detrimental effect such an affected environment has or can have on humans living in and on the world. While much of the poem’s language does warn against and anticipate “the variously predicted endings of the world,” or the destruction of “this once/ Relatively peaceful plane of being,” it is always a world for humans, “Which previously good karma had/ Allowed them to be reborn into” (72-73). While the statues are critical of humans and their institutions, what they critique most powerfully is the failure of humans to “treat each other with humanity” (72). Unlike the discussion of world-destruction, which the statues “are relieved of the necessity to witness,” concern about “your many social problems with each other,” and “hope” that they may be resolved, formulate the statues’ final send-off, closing the poem (72-73). Environmental catastrophe is human catastrophe; thus, the statues recycle conventional ecological thinking and language to talk about the human.

In this way, Savage’s poem is humanist in content and ecological in form. Savage’s poem, performed in a context of recycling, is also about recycling. It is also about conservation, however, and a monumental historical example of the failure to conserve an enmeshed natural/cultural object—a failure to conserve nature and the human. He performs the poem, however, within a space which does conserve the human: in the center aisle, between the two halves of the congregation, stands a video camera recording Savage’s sermon. The video will be added to the Project’s archives at the Library of Congress, “one of the two or three most significant and extensive archives of the New American Poetry in existence,” which contains recordings of nearly every event that has occurred within St. Mark’s since the Project’s inception (Champion).

Behind the camera, on a table manned by volunteers, sit copies of books by Anselm Berrigan (another poet who performs on this particular Wednesday)
and Savage himself—one of which (Brainlifts) will eventually provide source material for this essay. Many members of the audience (myself included) purchase Savage’s (and Berrigan’s) book, and are thus able to read along as they listen to his “words...placed in the air” (Brown 431). While the context of a performance certainly privileges the spoken over the written word, the Project maintains a more-or-less democratized presentation of language in its offering of the spoken word as a supplement. Thus, the “creativity and community” which Rueckert champions as the “highest motives of literature,” which are effected here by the performance of live poetry, are enmeshed with the material, physical texts which thrust (the same) poetry into pedagogical settings not limited by the four walls of the community room—the kinds of discourse communities that continue the energy exchange outside of St. Mark’s. The Project, as an efficiently operating ecosystem, but also a space that documents live art, is an institution of recycling and conservation.

The recycling and conservation of The Poetry Project are parts of the humanist ecological religion that it redoubles in St. Mark’s Church. Reverend Michael Allen, former Lay Minister for the Arts at St. Mark’s, “[has] gone so far as to claim artists and writers as his allies, for being among the very few in society who were, as he put it, “doing theology”” (qtd. in Champion). Along the same lines, Ginsberg remarks that “St. Mark’s has become my Church, my religion place” (Foreword xxvi). The enmeshed space, the economy of energy, and the performance and conservation thereof poetry are all elements of the “theology” and/or “religion” that the Project (largely through the “artists and writers” within it) does.

Much like the energy-efficient ecosystem the Project works on the level of imaginative production, its recycling of St. Mark’s Church is also an efficient use of sources which does not exhaust them. The (largely deconstructive) presence of the Project within the church does not displace or damage the church’s (original) function as a (conventional) religious space, nor as an artspace for other, co-existing communities the church houses. St. Mark’s has an “old history” as a “venue for poetry” and “has always been a culture church,” according to Ginsberg, who claims to have been at a reading there in the 1930’s with his father, and cites lectures and performances of jazz, dance, theater, and even magic occurring within St. Mark’s walls (Foreword xxiv). Miles Champion traces St. Mark’s “champion[ing] of the arts” even further back, to the 1800’s, acknowledging that the “unorthodox rectorship of the decidedly modernist Dr. William Norman Guthrie” of 1911-1937 effected a ramp-up in the artistic presence at the church (Champion). The space of the church is shared among the projects which inhabit it. Put differently, the co-existence and even conflation of the church’s religious
community and artistic communities and institutions, which continues to this day, is evidence that no one cultural eco-system (here) exhausts the environment in which it is occurring. The “rupture and redoubling” of the Project, if deconstructive, is not destructive—rather, it is a constructive religious ritual of recycling and of conservation, aimed toward an end of human ecology.

Environmental Activism

The two poets scheduled to read in St. Mark’s at 8:00 PM on Wednesday, December 4th, 2013, are Natalie Diaz and Diane Wakoski. Lee Ann Brown will make her way to this reading, although she will be a little bit late. Although she may miss one or both of (current Project Director and Wednesday Night Coordinator) Stacy Szymaszek’s characteristically comprehensive and warm introductions of the Californian poets, Brown will ultimately find herself participating in the human ecology occurring in St. Mark’s Church-in-the-Bowery on this Wednesday night, as she has on so many others. She will enter the enmeshed space, walking past Blackburn’s, Auden’s, and O’Hara’s trees; she will soak in the stored energy of performed poetry, without expending it; and she will help to compose a congregation that recycles the church’s surface into a space for live art, without exhausting the resource of space. All this amounts to the fact that Brown will contribute, as an audience member on this occasion, to the text of The Poetry Project. She will engage in human ecology—in activism—by supporting and making up part of a text that produces efficiently, recycles, and conserves. The reason she will be late to the reading, however, is that she will have venue-hopped; The Poetry Project is not the only cultural eco-system that Brown will participate in on this particular Wednesday.

Before arriving at St. Mark’s, Brown goes to another performance of live art in the Lower East Side, housed in One and One’s Nexus Lounge on 2nd Street and 1st Avenue. The show is an All-Star Showcase produced by The Inspired Word, a series—“movement”—of performance art that began “as strictly a poetry series in March 2009, on a blizzard of a Monday night at a sleepy vegan organic restaurant along Queens Boulevard in Forest Hills,” but which has since grown (and continues to grow) to be one of the most energetic live art performance series in New York City (Geffner). Current venues in which Inspired Word events take place include Bareburger East Village (5th Street and 2nd Avenue, 5 blocks from St. Mark’s Church in-the-Bowery), The Café at Broadway (310-318 West 53rd Street), Funkadelic Studios (209 West 40th Street), The Gallery at Le Poisson Rouge (158 Bleecker Street), and Tammany Hall (152 Orchard Street) (Geffner). Unlike the community room of St. Mark’s, the environment of this (and all) Inspired Word event(s) hardly mimics the attentive silence of a Mass; the crowd is incredibly attentive, but their loud interactions with the musicians (Caiikie, Tierney
Boisvert, and Craig Lawrence), comedian (Jocelyn Chia), and poet (me) compose a markedly different kind of religious fervor than that of the mock-congregation at the Project. However, like the Project, The Inspired Word recycles this and other spaces it uses—restaurants, bars/lounges, and a recording studio—into platforms for live art and non-entropic energy exchange. Also like the Project, it conserves performances in both photography and videography. Thus, Brown's venue-hopping on this Wednesday is from one human ecological project to another one. Brown's movement in-between cultural ecosystems on this particular Wednesday illustrates the potential for (non-wasteful) spillage out and crossover of energy that the local, enmeshed environment of Manhattan—especially downtown—provides. This is to say that multiple human ecological projects coexist, and participation in one does not (wholly) exhaust one's own ability to participate in another. The "sacrifice of Isaac" scenario in the environment of Manhattan occurs on a micro, rather than a macro level: it is always a decision between particular ecosystems on a particular evening, a decision to participate in—read/write—one of two or more simultaneous events—passages in human ecological narratives. Beginning at (exactly) the same time as my Inspired Word event (7:00 PM), a few blocks away at The Nuyorican Poets Café (236 East 3rd Street), Aimee Herman (an Inspired Word host), Dan Dissinger, and Megan DiBello of Poetry Teachers NYC are performing experimental poetry. The Nuyorican (established circa 1973), which houses poetry and/or live art-related events nearly every day of the calendar year, is a long-standing parallel to the economy of efficient energy exchange of The Poetry Project. The Project finds other, if newer and/or less established parallels in Bob Holman's Bowery Arts and Science (located at (and formerly called) Bowery Poetry Club, 308 Bowery) and so many other, smaller-scale collectives and series (mini-institutions): Urban Juke Joint (at Bahai Unity Center, 53 East 11th Street), The louderARTS Project (at Bar13, 35 East 13th Street), and The Epic 12 Collective , to name a small portion. On any (every) given night, live art is happening in Manhattan—efficient economies of energy exchange are working; human ecological narratives are being written.

The Poetry Project, as a text, is thus part of a bigger narrative—a bigger poetry project—happening in the Lower East Side specifically and across Manhattan and the rest of New York City more broadly. The cultural ecosystems this essay has described, as well as those that have escaped its scope and those that have yet to bloom into existence, are all epicenters of human ecology—of nature—in the city. The city, if largely composed of capitalistic institutions of destruction, is also composed of these counter-institutions that do human ecology through live art and poetry. We might return to Frank O'Hara, then, and update his Meditations in our emergency: "One need never leave the confines
of New York to get all the [ecology] one wishes" (Meditations 197). Ecological activism need not mean going out into mythical, virginal Nature and saving her from the tyrannical human; it might mean staying in the city. It might mean volitional bodily presence inside of the local environment: going to a bar, a lounge, or a church—for a different reason than we normally would—and buying admission and food/drink when applicable, supporting the venues that make up the local environment and allow live art (efficient production, recycling, conservation) to happen. Ecological activism might just mean supporting (y)our fellow human(s). And the way to start is with live poetry and live art.

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The Unconscious Desire: A psychoanalytic reading of Sepehri’s “Beyond the Seas” and Dickinson’s “I started Early – Took my Dog”

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The contemporary Persian Poet Sohrab Sepehri (1928-1980) was born in Kashan, the western city of Dasht-e-Kavir. There is not much biographical and critical information available on him because he mainly lives in reclusivity with only his mother and sister. (His single volume of collected books, Hasht Ketab (Eight Books) has been pretty popular in Iran since the time it was published. David L. Martin has stated in the introduction of Poems of Sohrab Sepehry, that although Sohrab was from the new generation of poets he was still under the influence of Islamic Sufism and mingled his aspiration toward nature with mystical philosophy. But we must know that he had not followed all their footsteps. (vii)

As a contemporary Persian poet he flourished in what Nima Yushij has established as a new fashion of Persian poetry, that gained a new look toward life, nature and even ethics. To borrow Shamia’s words, Sepehri had a “fresh look like water flowing in each and every moment of the river,” (qtd. in Sheibani 512)
That Sepehri’s poems show a deep world view of a learned man betoken by his travels to different countries from Europe and America to the Japan and India, also his reading of a lot of Persian and non-Persian poetries. But that he was under the influence of a specific writer is not known and is not our concern in this paper. What is interesting is how similar Sepehri’s poetry and thoughts, and even lifestyle are to the nineteenth century poetess of New England, Emily Dickinson.

Emily Dickinson (1830 – 1886) is one of the greatest and of course the most mysterious figures in English literature. Her lifestyle has always been under the magnifying eyes of critique and there have been lots of interpretations of her poetry regarding her eccentric life style. The fact that Dickinson was a reclusive woman in her time and merely communicated with others through letters is not unknown to anyone and like Sepehri this is the reason that there is not much information about her thoughts and beliefs available, except through the powerful words of her poetry. But Wendy Martin has alluded to an unlikely fact of Dickinson’s life that most readers are not aware of, in The Cambridge Introduction to Emily Dickinson, that she was not always so restricted to the house, in fact she traveled to many cities when she was a teenager with her father and sometimes she even traveled alone. (8) She was very prolific and wrote about 1,700 pieces of poetry that were found by her sister and published after her death. Bloom suggests that Emily Dickinson presents us “the most authentic cognitive difficulties” of all the nineteenth and twentieth century writings because of her “inventiveness, mastery of trope and craft” in her poems. (1)

Dickinson’s attitude toward life was much different from her own families. Like Sepehri she was not a mere conformist of the dominant ideologies. She did not believe in organized religion and she remained rebellious to the Calvinist doctrine and did not profess her faith publically. As Martin explained “She preferred the mortal certainty and mystery of death as well as the ability to define faith and spiritual relationships on her own terms” and as an adult determined her own beliefs according to her own priorities and shaped an independent, liberal view of life. (26-27)

Poetry and Dream Psychology

We attempt to base our critical study here on the traditional psychoanalytic theory of Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). The existence of the unconscious is one of the key concepts that govern the classical psychoanalysis. The Unconscious is the reservoir of those fears, desires, wounds and unresolved conflicts that are suppressed and locked up in our mind. (Tyson, Critical Theory 12-15) It shapes people’s identity and interestingly it is not at all passive and we can see some signs of it if we try to look psychoanalytically to the life. According to Freud the “unconscious ideas exist and are operative” and “they are among
the commonest facts of everyday life” (The Complete Works 199-200). So the unresolved conflicts which are repressed in the unconscious would return in forms that are usually overlooked by people. As an example we can see them in slip of the tongue, jokes, and specifically dreams. As Freud puts it in the Dream Psychology the dream creates a form of “psychical release for the wish which is either suppressed or formed by the aid of repression” (41) he further explains: there are few of us who could not affirm, from our own experience, that there emerges from time to time in the creations and fabrics of the genius of dreams a depth and intimacy of emotion, a tenderness of feeling, a clarity of vision, a subtlety of observation, and a brilliance of wit such as we should never claim to have a tour permanent command in our waking lives. There lies in dreams a marvellous poetry, an apt allegory, an incomparable humour, a rare irony. (The Complete works 571)

He later suggested in Interpretation of Dreams that dreams and poetry are related and that the relation is “neither sporadic nor accidental”, and the “penetrating insight of the poet” can be followed in “reverse direction” for interpretation and “trace a poem to dream”. (Interpretation 101)

Thus, as dream symbols can be interpreted to reveal the unconscious desires of human mind so can the poetic symbols and metaphors be interpreted linking the poet’s desires to the written words:

Most of the artificial dreams contrived by the poets are intended for some such symbolic interpretation, for they reproduce the thought conceived by the poet in a guise not unlike the disguise which we are to find in our dreams. (Freud, Interpretation 8)

The “sea” in Dickinson and Sepehri’s poem

Many poets have written about the sea and the trend could go back to the Homer’s time. The sea has always been fascinating to poets with all its hidden and mysterious attraction. Whether it is calm or stormy it always calls the poet’s mind. Some poets consider it as a way of adventure and a way of escape, like Ulysses, but some would consider it a vast place of hidden meanings, as a man’s unconscious, full of desirable things that one should dare to extract. Like Sepehri, whose poetry is indeed the reflection of his free thoughts and feelings, so is Dickinson’s which is packed with meaning and the pure imagination of the poet. But how do these two different poets encounter the “sea” and its attraction is going to be analyzed here. Dickinson’s “I started early-Took my dog” and Sepehri’s “Beyond the Seas” are both replete with “sea” imagery and symbolism. With the aid of Freudian psychoanalytic criticism we can reveal the similarities and differences of their thoughts and poetry. The two poems follow bellow. The first one is Dickinson’s poem. It has no title so it is referred to with its first line:
I started Early – Took my Dog –
And visited the Sea –
The Mermaids in the Basement
Came out to look at me –

And Frigates – in the Upper Floor
Extended Hempen Hands –
Presuming Me to be a Mouse –
Aground – opon the Sands –

But no Man moved Me – till the Tide
Went past my simple Shoe –
And past my Apron – and my Belt
And past my Boddice – too –

And made as He would eat me up –
As wholly as a Dew
Opon a Dandelion's Sleeve –
And then – I started – too –

And He – He followed – close behind –
I felt His Silver Heel
Opon my Ancle – Then My Shoes
Would overflow with Pearl –

Until We met the Solid Town –
No One He seemed to know –
And bowing – with a Mighty look –
At me – The Sea withdrew –

II

Sepehri's poem "Beyond the Seas" is drawn from his single volume of collected poems in Hasht Ketab (Eight Books) and is categorized in the seventh book called Hajm-e-Sabz (The Expanse of Green). It is a poem widely read by Iranian and even though it seems to be simple; this freestanding poetry deals with many deep and
complex meaning and is replete of metaphors and personal symbols that could not be easily perceived:

"Beyond the Seas"
I’ll put up a boat,
and set it free off the shore.
I’ll let it take me away-from this eerie land,
where nobody calls up the sleeping heroes-from their long, lonely trance.

I’ll put up a boat,
and set it free off the shore;
a boat with no net, a boat with no seine,
with my heart cleansed of wish for pearl.
I’ll sail away on the tides.
I’ll sing all along the ride.
Neither the blues of the deeps,
Nor the mermaids, the natives of the seas,
shall captivate me-from my solitary glide.

I’ll move on with pride.
I’ll sail away on the tides.
I’ll sing all along the ride:
“I’ll leave this eerie land behind;
in this land, Truth is forsaken, set aside,
here, no man recalls- how their heroes died,
here, of woman all but silence is denied.

I did not see a torch.
I did not see a loch.
I shall sail away-
for I am tired of the reign of opaque, thick panes,
I am longing for the crystal verse-
of an open space.

I’ll sail away on the tides;
I’ll sing all along the ride:
Beyond the seas,
There is another land;
Its windows open to the virtues of lights;
On its roofs, doves constantly stare—at the soar of human mind
Its children walk, with their backpacks full of faith, hope and trust.

“Beyond the seas,
There is another land.
People there, they care:
for the call of a gentle hill,
for the feel of a brief dream.
Its soil listens to the song of your soul.
Its breeze, spreads in air—the full flavour of flight.

“Beyond the seas,
There is another land;
Its dawn is weightless, vast and white,
with the freshness of a bird’s first flight.
Its poets are heirs of water, wind and light.”

Beyond the seas,
There is another land!
I shall put up a boat,
I will put up a boat.

Drawing out the dream symbols
There are plenty of symbols and metaphors and dream-like imageries in these two poems with hidden meanings that could be tapped upon. Considering them as a dream, it is possible to interpret them with the specific dream system. The “sea” is the dominant symbol in both poems and so we are going to mostly focus on sea imagery and the attitudes of the personas of two poems toward them. In Dickinson’s poem the persona came from the town to the sea and is seemed to be both afraid of the sea and attracted to it. She is struggling with her feelings and finally turns her back to the sea and returns to the town. Whereas in “Beyond the Seas” the persona of the poem that could also be associated with the poet himself is building a boat to sail on the sea and get away from where he is now, toward the city somewhere beyond the seas.
The “sea” is known to be the symbol of unconscious, emotion and sexuality. If we consider the “sea” in these poems as the symbol of sexuality and sexual desire we can find other related symbols that could relate to this repressed desire. The
"mermaids" emerging from the sea can stand for sexual attractions that are in the way of both speakers. The “pearls” as a part of the sea could stand for the overflow of sexuality so we can relate that the sea is full of sexual desire which overflows like the foams. The “Basement” which is at the bottom of the sea could symbolize the speaker’s subconscious and sexuality (Tyson, Using Critical Theory 43). On the other hand the “Frigate” or in Sepehri’s case the “boat” floating above the sea can be the symbol of the speaker’s conscious mind. Finally the “town” where the speaker flees to or run away from, can be considered as the symbol of the place at the opposite of the sea, where there is sexual restraints and laws.

The interpretation of the dream symbols
By analyzing these symbols now we are going to allude to the similarities and differences through the psychoanalytical perspective of both Dickinson and Sepehri’s poems.

Repression
Freud considers repression a process that we unconsciously apply on those unfulfilled wishes and conflicts of our “id” that are not allowed to be expressed be it for the existence of “superego” or “ego”. The theme of sexual repression is recognizable in Dickinson’s poem. So if we consider these symbols what Freud calls “disguised representation of their latent thoughts” (The Complete Works 820) we can interpret the speaker’s willingness toward it and her zeal to go and visit the sea, as an awakening of her sexual desire and her inclination to sexual relationship locked in her subconscious which is symbolized by the deep “Basement” of the sea. On the other hand there is restrictive feeling within her that does not let her desire to be willingly freed. This could be her conscious symbolized as the “Frigate” which is floating above the sea. So she wants it unconsciously and represses it with her conscious mind. In other words when the sea as the male symbol of sexuality full of passion surrounded her, she could not resist it until he went so far that she felt she is beginning to lose herself in the sea that her consciousness became active and she started to run away back to the town.

Likewise these symbols take place in Sepehri’s poem but what is interesting is the quite different reaction of the persona of his poem. The “sea” as the sexual desire within is there with all its attraction and gravity. It does try to trap the speaker by the “pearls” or the deep blue color and the captivating “mermaids” but he seems to be going on a mission and had built a “boat”. Unlike Dickinson, he is not so overwhelmed by sexual desire. He emphasizes that he will move on with “pride”. His aim is to go to the city beyond the “Seas”, so by gaining control over his internal desires he can reach a land where “Its windows open to
The role of superego

The “town” in Dickinson’s poem is as Tyson calls it “the restraint place of sexuality by customs and laws” (Tyson, Using Critical Theory 43). The speaker in Dickinson’s poem has “started early” to visit the sea. She was probably anxious to go out of town, but she had not maintained to go beyond the sea and after she encountered the sea she is on the verge of losing herself in the powerful sea and drowning in sexual desires when she describes that the sea:

Went past my simple Shoe –
And past my Apron – and my Belt
And past my Boddice – too –

Then she finally decided that she cannot let it environed her so she retreats and flees back to the town. Her ego has defeated her id and so she has to turn back to where the superego rules, the “town”.

The case is quite different with Sepehri. How he deals with his desires could be emanated from his cultural and traditional ethnic background. It seems that he is not just satisfied to get out of town nor he is satisfied by attraction of the sea and whatever is within it. He would rather build a boat and get as far as he could from the town and its people. He is dreaming of somewhere more sublime. From a psychoanalytical point of view, we encounter a vast difference between Sepehri and Dickinson in this case. While Dickinson almost surrenders herself to her desires, to be direct subconscious; and later her conscious that made her go back to the town, meaning she lets herself be ruled by the town’s law and restriction; Sepehri chose a quite different way. He could not be satisfied to just return to where he came from, so actually the superego could not make him to go back. He is disappointed of all town’s people and rules, he is tired of the town where “Truth is forsaken” and he continues:

I shall sail away-
for I am tired of the reign of opaque, thick panes,
I am longing for the crystal verse-
of an open space.

Different role of the “Frigate “or the “boat”

The “Frigate” in Dickinson’s poem is regarded as something that inhabits the “Upper floor” and as Tyson suggested is the symbol of the speaker’s conscious mind. (Tyson, Using Critical theory43) But the speaker considers herself like a mouse in contrast with the frigate and is afraid of it in some way which shows that her unconscious is much more active and she did not want to succumb to
her consciousness, where as in Sepehri's poem we see that the speaker wanted 
to build a “boat”. It is a vehicle for transference from where he is to where he 
wants to go. Indeed he likes to get away from his unconscious and be nearer to 
think consciously, with the “boat” floating above the “sea” he assumes he would 
be able to ride to a place where these transient attractions will give their place 
to some more utopian like things where “Its soil listens to the song of your soul”;
confirming what Kamran Talattof suggested in about the “weighty presence” of 
water in Persian poems including “hope and coming of better times.” (141)
It seems that Sepehri sticks to the second part of the famous proverb: “I will find 
a way or make a way”. After bidding a farewell to the city where “truth is forsaken” 
and “no man recalls- how their heroes died” he finally decides to sail away and 
never return.

Sepehri as a mystical figure
Sepehri’s attitude toward this journey is in some way very close to the 
mystical journey of the traditional poets of Iran. He is not much involved in his 
sexual desires and like a mystic he can ignore his desires in order to reach to the 
land with eternal ”truth”. As David I. Martin suggested in his book that Sepehri, 
being bestowed by his ancestors’ Sufi legacy, is “once again brought back into 
the mystical sphere in poetry” (xii). But how he showed his mysticism in poetry is 
rather different from the traditional poets. This difference is explained by Massud 
Farzan who considered Sepehri as a “Neo-Sufic” poet in The Neo-Sufic Poetry of 
Sohrab Sepehri:

A distinguishing characteristic which at the same time invites 
comparison with Persian Sufism is the constant suggestion in Sepehri’s poetry 
that reality can be recognized, love and compassion can be attained, not through 
accumulative knowledge but, via negativa, through the cleansing of the heart’s 
and mind’s mirror of its dust and grime. It is this quality of purity and lucidness 
safa) which gives Sepehri’s poetry its Sufic flavor and not any nomenclature or 
symbolism of traditional ‘erfan. (86)

Sepehri’s usage of unconventional symbolism makes his poem quite 
different from other poets. “He looks at the natural phenomena around him in a 
different way from his contemporaries.” (Pourjafari202)

In “Beyond the Seas” he uses the natural element common in life and 
defamiliarized them in order to add to the weight of his lofty goal. It seems that 
you feel him in the poem because of the use of the first person, but in some way 
you feel the persona is a kind of every man and what he should do is the goal of 
any human who is in search of the sublime meaning of life.
Conclusion

Considering the life of the contemporary Persian poet Sohrab Sepehri and the famous nineteenth century American poet Emily Dickenson we encounter that they both had a quite similar lifestyle, of being reclusive and confined to home, plus having a nonconformist attitude toward the social and religious doctrines which were dominant in their times. We also gather that their poetic imagination, through which they convey their message in the lines, were in some ways similar to each other. The two poems discussed in this paper; Dickinson's "I started Early – Took my Dog" and Sepehri's "Beyond the Seas"; seem to be simple on the surface, but they are both heavy in meanings. How these poems show the poets' tendency to express their feeling through nature and natural elements is interestingly alike. But of course differences could be seen in these poets' attitudes too. By analyzing some parts of these two specific poems from the Freudian psychoanalytic theory which indicates how unconscious and locked-in repressed desires incarnate in everyday life, we came to see that even though these poems were quite similar in the descriptive elements, the message that is drawn from each could be totally different. By choosing a rather mystical approach, Sepehri tends to escape from the city of restriction and laws to his utopian city beyond the seas, whereas Dickinson's speaker returns back to the city once again and would not resist the dominant laws of the superego.

Works Cited


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